by Air Marshal Satish Inamdar (retd)
'The central concern in the Services HQ
over the last 40 years or so has been a frustrating lack of appropriate and
timely government response to many crucial military issues, often till these
turn into a full blown crisis.'
Air Marshal Satish Inamdar (retd)
discusses the many challenges and issues confronting India's defence
establishment in the light of the recent Naresh Chandra report. The Naresh
Chandra Committee report on the armed forces, defence ministry and the Higher
Direction of War is believed to have recommended the creation of a fourth
four-star General/Flag/Air as the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee.
Notwithstanding the change in
designation of the three Services Chiefs (from Commander-in-Chief to Chiefs of
Staff), in 1954, they continue to be 'commanders' of their respective services.
In contrast, in most Western
democracies, the Chiefs of Staff are genuinely 'staff officers.' The heads of
operations, personnel, logistics etc report directly to the defence minister.
Only the Theatre Commanders are 'commanders' and they also report to the
minister.
Our Chiefs of Staff, in comparison, have
far more powers than their counterparts in many if not most, progressive
Western democracies.
Is that going to change in the
proposed new structure?
Whichever new apex armed forces
structure is put in place, it would have to necessarily pre-suppose a
considerable change of mindset and attitude towards matters military in India
in general, and in the political establishment (its public pronouncements
notwithstanding!) in particular, if it is to deliver with the necessary speed,
substance and success.
Removing the unstated but lurking
politico-bureaucratic trust deficit towards the military -- no matter how
inexplicable and baseless -- must become part of such a change. This is
possible only with a far greater appreciation and formal understanding of the
armed forces in real terms among our civilian government functionaries than
what perhaps obtains today.
For the higher direction of war in India
to be effective, inspiring and substantive, the near-complete dependence of the
political establishment on the civilian bureaucracy for many if not most inputs
on the armed forces, has to either go, or the bureaucracy must evolve or get
structured differently, or, preferably, both.
The central concern in the Services HQ
over the last 40 years or so has been a frustrating lack of appropriate and
timely government response to many crucial military issues (often till these
turn into a full blown crisis).
This delayed response can be due to
innate inability, indifference, ignorance or overwhelming preoccupation with
party, legislative and electoral politics of the many political bosses.
This gets compounded by a not uncommon
lack of genuine empathy and informed insight into military affairs among
sections of the bureaucracy. Oversight sans accountability on the part of some
of these officials, either institutional or individual, only makes a bad
situation worse.
Inadequate or de facto lack of delegation of powers
(financial and administrative) to the Service Chiefs and lower down often
hampers many issues affecting not only capital acquisitions, but also the
day-to-day running of the three wings of the armed forces of the Union.
This is perhaps the result of the Army,
Navy and Air Force being (often not very subtly) treated like mere underling
departments of the defence ministry instead of being treated as equal stake
holders in National Security and an integral part of the composite whole.
Look at the Ministry of External
Affairs. Indian Foreign Service bureaucrats spend a continuous lifetime on the
same job, studying and mastering foreign affairs and policy. Those in the
Ministry of Defence (MoD), in sharp counterpoint, are invariably, if not
always, an itinerant population and as a result get to deal with complex
military, defence, security, and strategy matters only during their short,
widely spaced tenures in the MoD.
Is that desirable in this day and age?
While this is certainly not an aspersion
on the competence and dedication of individual bureaucrats, the point is, will
the present situation ever deliver militarily, especially in a two-front
conflict? Can or must that be changed partially or wholly?
Even granting the basic difference --
that while IFS bureaucrats are also the MEA's operating arm in the field, the
field operations arm of the MoD is not its IAS officers, but the three
uniformed Services -- the near total and consistent absence of MoD bureaucrats
(past and present) at the various defence, security, military and strategy
related conclaves in Delhi comes as a surprise, if not dismay!
One always sees a large number of former
IFS officers not just attending such events regularly, but also contributing in
a major and meaningful way. This must mean something and should not be
dismissed with an imperial wave of the hand.
It may be that the role of MoD
bureaucrats with regard to the armed forces and defence, as conceived and
formulated by government is one of pure 'supervision, oversight and control'
and does not, therefore, require them to either develop an informed insight
into the military or to be given continuity of service in that ministry.
If that is so, does that role need
redefinition in the interest of expediency and dispatch now, when the nature,
content and format of warfare itself is in the melting pot?
In the MEA, not only is the IFS a
dedicated, single purpose cadre, even its clerical staff is mostly permanent,
unlike in the MoD. There were, no doubt, good reasons for this dispensation in
the MoD in the beginning, but is it not now time to at least take a second,
concerned look?
One possible way to redress this
situation is to review the 'Generalist' nature of the IAS which may have been
progressively overstretched, overestimated or overplayed as far as Defence at
least is concerned.
The other way is to fill many if not
most officer posts in the MoD at all levels with a mix of IAS, IFS and military
officers with suitable backgrounds and experience and in the numbers needed in
order to speedily, empathetically and efficiently meet the overall needs of the
armed forces in the 21st century.
A similar staffing-pattern mix at
Services HQ can also be examined concurrently if it promises to improve
matters. It probably will. One of the things this will certainly lead to is the
actual integration of the MoD and the Army-Navy-Air Force HQ, which has been
tom-tommed for many years, but nothing has happened about it. All that has
changed is the mere nomenclature of two wings of the armed forces. Nothing more,
either in spirit or in substance: lip service at its best....or worst!
At the risk of iteration, unless there
is a change in the present levels of knowledge and appreciation of defence
matters and a clear shift in attitude and mindset towards the armed forces in
the politician-bureaucrat combine, any exercise in beefing up or streamlining
the apex military structure runs the risk of remaining less than complete or a
reform on paper alone.
Hopefully, the Naresh Chandra Committee
Report will not only start the process of change, but also prepare the ground
for further changes over the years. It must, unlike the earlier Subrahmanyam
Committee and GOM reports, posit the possible and the immediately
implementable, as against the ideal, the perfect and the best, which in most
cases cannot be taken forward.
Given the pre-eminence and outstanding
track record of the chairman and the members of this committee and the
collective hopes of a very large segment in India, it is my belief that one can
and should expect a fascinating report: Path-breaking in its approach, bold in
its content and revolutionary in its recommendations.
Anything short of this would be a
lamentable anticlimax and a monumentally lost opportunity!
What the government does with the report
subsequently is anybody's guess. The MoD repositories can be deep, dark and
cavernous!
Air Marshal Satish Inamdar (retd) PVSM, VSM, is a former
Vice-Chief of the Air Staff.
Honorable Raksha Mantri Ji,
ReplyDeleteWhile an organizational imbalance has existed in India's Defence set up since independence, despite numerous specialist Committees recommending changes, it is only in recent years that there has been a widespread public outcry on the issue since the deteriorating civil military relations, now at their Nadir, impact our National Security adversely. The burst of public outcry is the consequence of the realization that National Security impacts EVERY citizen and is not a matter for the Defence services alone.
The need for URGENT reforms in the way we run our National Security Apparatus, needs NO emphasis, and we Citizens urge you to have this immediately (as of Yesterday, so to say) attended to, lest we suffer any debacle as a consequence. And let me caution Sir, on need to avoid over confidence with some marginal (too little, too late) changes announced in recent times. This can be dangerous. Our self assured stance in 1962 led to one of the greatest humiliation in Indian history.
I forward herein, an article by a Senior Veteran. Kindly read it. Importantly, please have some open interactions with various Think Tanks, not restricted to the MOD, and Please, Please hasten the process of change, against which you are bound to have a 'non specialist', 'generalist' resistance.
PS. Sir, As this article is in public domain already, I am simultaneously sharing it with friends and responsible citizens.
With Warm Regards,
Col RP Chaturvedi,