THE HIMALAYAN DEBACLE

By Lt Gen (Retd) S K Sinha

An authentic account of Sino-Indian War of 1962 and the events following it.

PART  1  -  THE  BACKGROUND

October 20 is the fiftieth anniversary of our Himalayan Pearl Harbour.  The humiliation of a highly professional army of two centuries standing, with an outstanding war record in battles fought over different continents, stunned the world.  During the two world wars, the Indian Army earned a very enviable reputation among the Allied armies.  Winston Churchill referred to the over two million Indian Army in laudatory terms, describing it as the largest volunteer army known to history.  Having seen the prelude to the 1962 war from close quarters at the highest level, I shall recount how the Army had started hurtling down towards an abyss from 1959 or even earlier.   Lt Gen B M Kaul and Air Vice Marshal Harjinder Singh were both favourites of Defence Minister Krishna Menon and had direct access to him.  Besides, General Kaul was very close to Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru.   The first three days of that war followed by a lull of nearly three weeks and then the total disaster in the last three days.  The strong defences at Se La were abandoned by 4 Infantry Division.  It withdrew without putting up a fight. It was the same Division which in the Second World War was regarded as the ace division of Allied armies during the North African campaign.  It had played a key role in the historic battle of El Alamein.  The Chinese pursued the demoralised and routed Division down to the foothills near Tezpur. The war ended with China declaring unilateral cease fire and their withdrawing  to the MacMohan Line.  The Nation’s faith in the impregnability of the Himalayas, the infallibility of our foreign policy and the invincibility of our Army lay shattered.

A few weeks before he died,  ailing Sardar Patel wrote a very perceptive letter to Jawaharlal Nehru on 17 December 1950, warning him about Chinese intentions and the need to make suitable defence preparations in the  Himalayas.  Nehru was then in the grip of Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai euphoria.  He did not attach much importance to this letter.  However, the Minister of State for Defence,  Himmat Singh was asked to chair a committee to examine the issue.  His report is not now traceable.  It is said that Sardar Patel asked Jai Ram Das Daulat Ram the Governor of Assam and responsible for NEFA , to send a column to establish India’s sway over Towang, which lay South of the MacMohan Line.  The Lhasa Government had been collecting revenue from Towang from before China’s occupation of Tibet.  Major Bob Cutting a brave Naga erstwhile army officer was then serving in IFAS, later absorbed in IAS.  He then posted at Bomdila was given the task of establishing control over Towang.  He departed with a company of Assam Rifles and a large number of porters for Towang, along a difficult mountain foot track. It took him nearly two weeks to reach his destination.   With a show of force and tact, he got the Tibetan officials to accept Indian control over Towang.  Had he not done so, today Towang would have today been in occupation of China.  Nehru had no prior information of this move and was upset when he heard of it.  He felt that it would ruffle diplomatic feathers.  Anyway, the deed had been done and he had to reconcile to it.   After the 1962 war, Henderson-Brooks - Bhagat report examined the course of operations and the reasons for our debacle.  Fifty years have now elapsed and this report is still under wraps.  It is generally believed that Neville Maxwell had access to the report.  His book, India’s China War is based on it.

A look at the top personalities involved in the run up to the 1962 disaster is revealing.  Jawaharlal Nehru was a great colossus.  The people had full faith in his judgment and no one dare express contrary views.  Nehru trusted Krishna Menon implicitly and had a blind spot for him. Both Nehru and Menon firmly believed that China will never go to war with India.  Menon was said to have been a red card holder. He was a highly intelligent person but very abrasive with his juniors and those who opposed him.  As Defence Minister, he would deal directly with junior officers short circuiting the normal chain of command.  He had favourites and promoted factionalism.  He showed little regard for Service Chiefs.  Bhola Nath Mullik was an outstanding Director Intelligence Bureau, whose forte was internal intelligence.  He had become the Man Friday of Jawaharlal Nehru.  At that time there was no dedicated organisation for external intelligence.  Adequate military intelligence about China or Tibet was not available.  The fact that the Chinese woefully lacked suitable airfields in Tibet was known to US intelligence but we in India were perhaps unaware of this.  Mullick had an anti Army bias and fueled the politician’s fear of the man on horseback.  The bureaucracy reinforced this for its vested interests, marginalising the military in decision making.  The Service Chiefs did not interact directly with the Prime Minister.    

Details about senior Army officers at the helm on the eve of the 1962 war and during the course of it, are also relevant.  General Thimayya was the Army Chief till a year before that war broke out.  He was a very professional and  charismatic military leader.  He was the only Indian who had commanded a brigade in battle during the Second World War.  He did so in the hardest fought Battle of Kangaw in Burma against the Japanese, earning a high gallantry award.  In the battle of Zoji La in Kashmir, he used tanks to break through the 10,000 feet high pass.  This was the first time in military history that tanks were used at that height.  I am an eye witness to Thimayya as the Divisional Commander leading the assault in a tank.  As Chairman of the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission in Korea, he earned international fame.  No General with better credentials had become the Army Chief.  Yet Thimayya was not familiar with the ways of politics and politicians.  He had strong differences with Krishna Menon which got aggravated by the promotion of Maj Gen Kaul to Lt Gen  and his posting as QMG in Army Headquarters aginst Thimayya’s recommendations..  Kaul as his Chief of Staff in Korea used to bypass him and exploit his connection with Jawaharlal Nehru.  Thimayya’s resignation in 1959 caused a nationwide stir. Nehru persuaded him to withdraw his resignation, pointing out that Field Marshal Ayub Khan was transiting through Delhi and his resignation will send out a wrong message, tarnishing India’s image.  Later Nehru castigated him in the Parliament. He failed to resign over this.  This seriously damaged Thimayya’s reputation and did immense harm to the Army.  Had he resigned again citing lack of defence preparedness in the Himalayas, things could have been set right and the 1962 war prevented.  Instead, he sulked and became a lame duck Chief for his remaining tenure.   General Thapar took over from him and was the Chief during the 1962 war.  Lt Gen Thorat was Eastern Army Commander.  He had won a gallantry award as a battalion commander in the battle of Kangaw and again in Korea as Commander of the Custodian Force.  He wanted to hold a defensive line based on Towang –Bomdila- Along.   

These places being at road heads, we would be better placed administratively than the Chinese advancing a hundred miles from the border, dependent on foot or mule tracks in mountainous terrain.  Thorat had planned small listening posts covering the approach tracks near the border.  These posts were trip wire posts to give early warning and not to put up any fight.  Well behind this line would be a line of covering troops in good tactical positions to gain time and impose attrition.  They were then to withdraw to the well stocked main defences which were to be held at all costs to the last man and defeat the enemy offensive.   Thorat retired a year before the 1962 war. The third General holding a key appointment at that time was Lt Gen L P Sen who had also won a gallantry award commanding a battalion in the battle of Kangaw.  On 7 November 1947 as Brigade Commander, he routed the invading Pakistan forces in the decisive battle of Shelatang on the outskirts of Srinagar.  That saved Srinagar and liberated the Valley.  Over the years his family problems had broken him and he was now a different man.  He was Eastern Army Commander during the 1962 war.   Lt Gen Kaul with no combat experience and from a non combat wing  service of the Army was appointed the field commander in NEFA to fight the Chinese.  During the run up to that war and its conduct, our competent and combat experienced senior military commanders, were rendered ineffective. The individual gallantry of our soldiers in the prevailing circumstances was of no avail.  However, under competent military leadership in the West, the Army gave a good account of itself in Ladakh..

PART  2  -  THE PRELUDE,  THE WAR  AND  AFTER

In 1960, to my great surprise I was posted to Quarter Master General’s Branch at Army Headquarters.  I was not happy about this posting but I had no option.  The all powerful QMG, Lt Gen Kaul desired that I report to him immediately.  When I reported to him, he told me that he had specially selected me to work as his personal staff officer as also with the newly started operational logistic cell of three officers including me.  This cell is now a large Directorate of Logistics under a General officer. I will record two instances which I witnessed to show how powerful Kaul had become.

One day when I was in Kaul’s room he received a telephone call about an Air Force Dakota on a supply mission in Nagaland being shot down and pilots taken prisoners by Naga insurgents.  He rang up Nehru direct and apprised him of this.  He told him that he was going to Nagaland immediately.  He asked an Air Force plane to be positioned at Palam at once to take him to Nagaland.  He asked me to inform the Chief’s Secretariat that the QMG was going to Nagaland to conduct operations!  QMG deals with administration and does not conduct operations.  This is the responsibility of the General Staff.  Yet everyone acquiesced to Kaul having his way.

The other instance was when Kaul took me with him to a meeting in Defence Minister’s room to discuss air maintenance ln Ladakh . I was dealing with that subject and I had all the statistics with me. The Defence Secertary, Pulla Reddy, a senior ICS officer was at the meeting.  So was Air Marshal Engineer, the Air Chief along with some senior Air Force officers.  At the instance of Menon, we had recently started getting military hardware from Soviet Russia.  Earlier, we were obtaining  all our military equipment from the West.  We had recently acquired AN 12 transport aircraft from the Soviets for use in Ladakh.   Menon was under the impression that the Indian military brass was not too happy with this.  This was the first time I saw Menon from close quarters.  He drank several hot cups of black tea at quick intervals.  It was said that during the day he would drink over sixty cups of tea.  He appeared to have a bad liver that morning.  He told Pulla Ready that he had neither any pull nor was he ever ready.  The Air Chief stated that flying to Ladakh was very hazardous and he wanted to ground the AN 12s to carry out some checks.  Menon replied sarcastically that all sorts of checks and trials had been carried out before acquiring the AN 12s.  It was now too late in the day to have philosophic doubts about their performance.  He added that of course flying to Ladakh was hazardous but since when has service in the Air Force begun to be equated with taking out a life insurance policy. Engineer persisted that he wanted checks to be carried for only two days.  Krishna Menon now burst out saying, “ Air Chief your mind is like a magnetic compass which reacts to every gravitational change in the earth . As Defence Minister, I refuse to function like a gardener who pulls out a plant every morning to see what progress it has made.”  I was stunned at the Minister’s language.  Half way through the meeting Kaul stood up and said that he had to go to an important meeting and was leaving me to answer any queries pertaining to the Army. I was surprised to see that Krishna Menon nodded his head and Kaul departed.  The meeting appeared bizarre and to this day,  I vividly recall the language used by Krishna Menon.   

    

Kaul was a workaholic and had tremendous drive.  He achieved much in organising logistic support for operational plans.  However, he was very ambitious and lacked strategic vision.  He had political ambitions.  After becoming Chief he apparently wanted to be Prime Minister thereafter.  A book, After Nehru Who, published at that time mentioned him as a possible successor.  More than half his time he devoted to work not connected with his duties as QMG. Yet he did not neglect his duties and he was one of our successful QMGs.

He laid the foundation for Directorate of Logistics.  For the first time Administrative Instructions for the three operational Commands spelling out logistic plans were issued.  In event of war with Pakistan, the Armoured Division from Jhansi Babina was to concentrate in Punjab in three weeks at its operational locations in Punjab.  He felt that this was much too long.  He reduced this period to three days.  Under his personal guidance, we worked tirelessly to achieve this target.  Railways agreed to keep fifty per cent of the rolling stock stationed permanently in Jhansi Babina, so that in emergency train moves could start from the very first day instead of a couple of days later.  Units were trained to reduce loading unloading time by half. All passenger and goods trains on the route had to be suspended for three days to allow simultaneous troop  specials on both Up and Down railway lines. Flyovers at level crossings en route were constructed for uninterrupted road and rail move.  Distance to be covered by road convoys each day was increased by 25 per cent.  It took nearly six months to complete this plan. A successful skeleton rehearsal was held to validate it.  In the East, Kaul wanted to improve administrative infrastructure to support large scale operations.  There was then no bridge over the Brahmaputra. He planned an Army Maintenance Area to hold stocks North of the river. A vast jungle area of a thousand acres was acquired at Narangi, North of Guwahati. The process of acquiring land, clearing jungles, constructing miles of internal roads, and hard standings with overhead covers began.  The jungles were cleared.  Several thousand of tons of ammunition, equipment and stores were earmarked for this Maintenance Area.  Work on improving the road from the foothills to Towang via Bomdila began.  There was no road in the hundred mile stretch from Towang to the border. Work on all this started in 1960 but during monsoon work had to be suspended. Although much progress was made to complete all this gigantic task, when the shooting war started in 1962, it was nowhere complete.

Thimayya  was approaching  retirement in late 1961.  He recommended Thorat to succeed him and Lt Gen Verma appointed CGS.  Kaul ensured that his recommendation was turned down.  Thapar became the Army Chief and Kaul took over as CGS.  He nominated me for a very coveted course in the UK.  I went abroad for a year and I returned in September 1962.

         

Kaul had a flair for administration and had extraordinary drive. He used his political clout to achieve results. He lacked strategic and tactical ability.  He proved to be a poor commander in battle. He promoted factionalism for his political motives.  He projected himself as a nationalist and took to wearing buttoned up coats when almost all officers wore lounge suits.  He tried to build his coterie in the officer corps often championing the cause of some superseded officers. He was good at doling favours to ambitious officers. He had a court of inquiry convened against Manekshaw for anti national activities. The inquiry exonerated Manekshaw. He discarded Thorat’s sound operation plan and sponsored forward policy instead with a bravado that not an inch of Indian territory, will be conceded even temporarily.  Thus he deployed a totally ill prepared and ill provided brigade on the indefensible Namka Chu river line against the enemy on the dominating Thagla ridge.  This brigade got wiped out within hours of the commencement of the war.     

                     

In his enthusiasm, he exposed himself to the severe climate in the high mountains and took ill for a while. He continued to command the Corps from his sick bed in Delhi. After recovering quickly he rushed back to his Headquarters at Tezpur well before the period of lull was over.  The Chinese infiltrated behind Se La in the rear, cutting off the Division.  The Divisional Commander panicked and sought permission to withdraw. The Army Chief and Eastern Army Commander were present at Tezpur but did not intervene, waiting for Kaul to return from Walong Sector.  When Kaul returned in the evening, he was persuaded by the Divisional Commander to allow him to withdraw.  In somewhat similar circumstances, when the British Eighth Army was routed by Rommel’s Panzers during the North Africa campaign in 1942 and he withdrew to El Alamein. General Auchinleck who was the theatre commander, immediately rushed from Cairo to El Alamein. He sacked Eighth Army Commander Lt Gen Ritchie and took over personal command of the Army at El Alamein. He stabilised the situation and saved Egypt. Unfortunately our top army leadership on that fateful day at Tezpur suffered a paralysis  of taking sound military decision. The Divisional Commander conducted a totally disorganized withdrawal on the night of 17/18 November night.  The Division withdrew without putting up any fight. The withdrawal became a complete rout.  The following day the famous 4 Infantry Division was virtually decimated.  By the 19^th the Chinese reached the foothills and then declared unilateral cease fire. Our top military leadership had totally failed, letting down the Army and the Nation. 

                         

Had the Army Chief taken up matters directly with the Prime Minister to ensure that the Thorat plan was not shelved and protested against the forward policy, had he  sacked the Divisional Commander and even removed the Corps Commander and had he ordered the troops at Se La to fight it out to the last and hold the formidable Se La defences at all costs, the rout would have not taken place.  After the humiliating war when Thorat met Nehru and told him about his plan, he enquired why he had not been apprised about the plan before the war.  Menon advocating Forward Policy had deliberately failed to do so.  Further, had the then Air Chief gone to the Prime Minister and insisted on the use of  offensive air power, the war would have taken a very different course. Unlike the Chinese, we had developed airfields close to the area of operations. Though less in numbers, we had a qualitative edge over Chinese combat aircraft.  The Chinese lacked the capability to bomb our cities.  The Indian Air Force could have inflicted crippling losses on the Chinese and boosted the morale of the soldiers on the ground.  The history of the Royal Air Force in the famous Battle of Britain during the Second World War could have been repeated by our Air Force.

                              

After this diasatrous war Nehru was totally shattered.  He desperately appealed for offensive support from the US Air Force.  Churchill faced a much greater disaster after Dunkirk in the Second World War.  The entire British field Army had been destroyed and Britain was bereft of any allies.  In our case the bulk of our field army was intact and we had friends to help us. Relations between Soviet Russia and China were breaking.  With the Himalayan passes closing due to snow in winter and the Chinese invading army not having heavy guns or tanks, we could make the Chinese bite the dust that winter.  In 1940,  Winston Churchill after the Dunkirk debacle, thundered declaring,  “We shall fight on the beaches, fight in the streets but never surrender.”Jawharlal Nehru meekly accepted the unilateral Chinese Cease Fire and a broken Prime Minister broadcast on the Radio that his heart went out to the people of Assam.

                     

I had returned from the UK in September 1962 and was an Intructor at Staff College in Wellington. I closely watched from a great distance in South India, the tragic drama unfolding in NEFA. After the war, I was sent to the battlefield areas and study what had happened for updating our mountain warfare training doctrine.    I went over the ground and also interacted with many friends at my level, who had participated in that war. I found that we had lost sight of our experience in Burma during the Second World War.  Strong defensive positions must not be abandoned even when enemy infiltrates behind and isolate them.  Defensive positions can be air maintained. More casualties are suffered in withdrawal which tends to become a rout than in fighting from prepared defences. We updated at the Staff College our training doctrine accordingly.     

                        

I also interacted with officers who had participated in the recent operations.  There were three main reasons for our debacle. These were mismatch between foreign policy and defence policy, isolation of the military in the process of decision making including lack of direct interaction between the Prime Minister and Service Chiefs,  and army officers losing their elan.  There is now better interaction between defence and foreign policy but this needs to be institutionalised.  Cosmetic changes in higher defence organisation without a CDS and full integration of the Defence Ministry with Service Headquarters, will not do.  During the wars of 1965 and 1971,  Gen Chaudhuri was interacted directly with Lal Bahadur Shastri and Gen Manekshaw with Indira Gandhi respectively. This brought about successful results. The bureaucratic stranglehold in Ministry of Defence must be eliminated bringing our Defence functioning at the apex level, at par with other democracies in the world.  Constantly lowering the protocol status of military officers and denying them legitimate emoluments and career prospects, are not conducive to maintaining their elan.  As for defence preparedness, unlike the Chinese, we have been lackadaisical. Weapon acquisition, improving defence infrastructure and our Defence capability are not keeping pace. The recent decision to cancel the raising of a mountain corps during the Chinese Defence Minister’s visit is incredible.

                            

In conclusion, I may mention that the darkest clouds have silver linings. The 1962 catastrophe also was a wakeup call for us. Thus we could shatter Ayub Khan’s dream of his tanks rolling down the plains of Panipat. And in 1971, we could achieve a decisive and historic victory.  Let us not at all costs go back to the somnolence of the pre 1962 days.  Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty. 

“Poor military leadership, not equipment, led to 1962 debacle: Report under Wraps” - Comments

More Comments on 1962 Sino-Indian War by Anant Bewoor.

1. Forget about the Def Secy and Foreign Secy being shown the door, what about BN Malik Director IB. His outfit was singularly responsible for the crass negligence towards Chinese perceptions about the border dispute. The IB was full of arrogance and no one could override or disagree with BN Mailk. No politician had any idea what intelligence was. Nehru had the External Affairs with him, Menon was playing around with the Services. Who was willing to "listen carefully to the generals". I was but a lad in 1957/58 when father was Bde Cdr in Ambala under 4 Div commanded by Biji Kaul. 4 Indian Div (Red Eagle Div), of North Africa fame was busy building houses under OP AMAR, the project that reiterated that there was no danger to India's borders as envisaged by Nehru / Malik / Cabinet / Menon / bureaucrats. Many will not remember that our Ordnance Factories were producing coffee perculators / toasters / and other white goods. And writers have the gall to say that military leadership was the primary cause of 1962 performance? Naturally all the Brig John Dalvi's 7 Brigade had was toasters to throw at Chinese troops, and Menon was drinking tea in a restaurant named Laguna in Connaught Place, I have seen him there.

2. Blaming Thapar was easy, he was Chief. How come no one blamed Malik? Not even today. Reason is that blaming Malik means blaming Nehru and Gulzari lal Nanda. Comparing Ladhak with NEFA, Tawang / Walong sector is wrong. Gen Daulat Singh and his commanders remained who they were and Kaul could not interfere, because Daulat Singh would not take it, and Kaul knew it. But because Eastern Command was in Lucknow, 4 Corps was created in Tezpur, and Kaul took it over. What did he do to make East defendable since he was CGS? Nothing. He behaved like the CIGS, the I standing for Imperial.  It is easy to crucify Pathania who was given 4 Div after removing Niranjan Prasad. What did Pathania have to fight with? What strategic / tactical orders did Kaul issue from Tezpur / Delhi / or his sick bed? What intelligence did Malik provide? Pathania had a history of gallantry, being a Military Cross + MVC. Not chota mota decorations. Powers in Delhi must have thought he will create miracles. But he was not the "baba" who was Mailk's guru. For years IB policemen swore that, and I quote freely as heard in late 60s, " when baba raised his hand, the Chinese stopped, and went back"  Now it is upto those who can, to find out who was this baba. I saw him only once on board an AN-12.

3. There is also comment about supply drops falling into the hands of the Chinese and not Indians. It is true that this happened. On many occasions, by the time our Daks reached the DZ as indicated to Jorhat, Indian forces had withdrawn South. There being no contact between ground and aircraft, the drop went through as planned. The write up makes it sound as though inspite of all modern commn the drops were a big mess. In the West, it was different. Leh based troops were acclimatised. Open areas permitted photo recce, recall Jaggi Naths photos of Chinese troops. This was not possible in NEFA. Besides, many units fought well in NEFA, and units also failed in Ladhak. The IAF was held back for all sorts of reasons. Whether offensive air support could have been given successfully is a matter for debate given the primitive commn, lack of FACs, swift retreats, and no definable Front Line of Own Troops. That is not germane here.

4. Most surely our troops were badly kitted and poorly armed for mountain warfare. Look at it this way in 2012. If VK Singh can say that the civilian bureaucrats with their political masters have made the Army "nanga", and not one Indian is worried, the same situation prevailed in the late 50s with the very same interlocutors, Generals / politicians / bureaucrats. What is the difference, same difference. If a Chief threatens to resign today and tells Indians on TV prime time why he is resigning, who is bothered? Will any NGO, political party, Mamta, Mayawati, Thakery, Lallu, Jayalalitha make an issue. No way. So what impact would have resulted by resignations of Thapar, Sen, Thorat, Daulat, Engineer, Arjan, Jaswant, etc ? In 1962 no one except maybe a few 100 people in Delhi would have known, Akaashvani would not have broadcast it. BN Malik would have frightened Nehru by calling it an attempted coup. Resigning is not the solution, never has been. Resigning is what Arjun wanted to do at Kurukshetra,  I am not being dramatic, the story tells us that, and his adviser prevents him from doing so. The rest we all know.

5. Maxwell wrote well, much of what he says has merit. Lets not forget that Henderson Brooks was commanding XI Corps, Bhagat was his BGS, and Daulat was his Army Cdr. I am certain that at least one copy of the report is somewhere waiting to be found. Wonder why no journalist has pursued this? Gen HB could not have consigned everything to Army HQ / MOD. The military can prepare itself, troops / officers can be motivated, training can be done, equipment can be kept fully serviceable etc. But what does a military commander do with out of date fighting weapons? What does he do when his boys do not have even a OG jersey, not even angola shirts, forget great coats, mittens, woolen socks, high ankle boots etc. How does he ensure food when MOD has not sanctioned resources for setting up Rear Area Supply Zones. MOD says not reqd, there is no danger from China, no funds will be given. Can the commander loot a granary? Yes, many unit / bde / Div cdrs / platoon cdrs failed, were overtaken by events, and every failed commander was sacked. Who was sacked from MOD, which politician resigned? There used to be Three Dy Def Ministers then, who resigned?

6. Now recall the very recent IPKF fiasco. Our troops were with SLRs against AK-47s. Our troops had no maps, poor intelligence, uncertain and conflicting orders, hastily gathered, all commanders were sure that it will end within a few weeks. This in 1987, exactly 25 years after Bomdi La, Se La, Walong, Chushul, Chip Chap etc. Are we doubting military leadership? But unit commanders were sacked. If I am correct more Indians died in Lanka than in 1962, I may be wrong. Once again, why did we intervene? This was not an adventure planned and conceived by generals of the Indian Army. The whole thing came out of RAW, MEA, PMO, with gung-ho inputs from Army Hq. Which MEA / PMO / RAW offical was dismissed? Many army guys went home.

7. There is a need for the 1962 battles to be explained to Indians thru TV. Anchors can take it up if Vadras, Khurshids, Gadkaris, Kejriwals, Khaps, will allow them to do so. Gross misconceptions and misinformation is floating around freely, has been for the last 50 years, and keeping the report secret adds to the disinformation. Chinese can say what they want. We know that they had to go back since their lines had become too long and could easily be cut off. The "baba" had nothing to do with it. They had an aim, it was achieved, they went back. How much pressure USSR or USA & UK put seems to be unknown, but it must have been there. And lets not forget Nehrus famous line that my heart goes out to the people of Assam. He was ready to abandon the East. Who gave him inputs to say such a dastardly thing? Certainly not Thapar.

Best wishes

Anant Bewoor

50 Years After 1962: A Personal Memoir

by B.G. Verghese 

(Then Assistant Editor and War Correspondent, The Times of India)

A must read Article on Sino-Indian War of 1962 and its aftermath

The 1962 Sino-Indian conflict is half a century old, but to understand what happened one needs to go further back to Indian independence and the PRC’s establishment and absorption of Tibet. Perhaps one should go back even earlier to the tripartite Simla Convention of 1914 at which the Government of India, Tibet and China were party and drew the McMahon Line. The Chinese representative initialled the Agreement but did not sign it on account of differences over the definitions of Inner and Outer Tibet.

Fast forward to March 1947 when Nehru’s Interim Government hosted an Asian Relations Conference in Delhi to which Tibet and China (then represented by the KMT) were invited. Both attended. India recognised the PRC as soon as it was established in 1949 and adopted a One-China policy thereafter.

In 1951 China moved into Tibet. A 17-Point Agreement granted it autonomy under Chinese sovereignty. This converted what until then was a quiet Indo-Tibet boundary into a problematic Sino-Indian frontier, with China adopting all prior Tibetan claims.

Even prior to that Sardar Patel had expressed himself on new security concerns in the Northeast. In a letter to Nehru he warned that the Himalaya could no longer be regarded as an impenetrable barrier and that the Tibeto-Mongoloid character of the population on “our northern and northeastern approaches… and the penetration of communist ideologies into some of these areas, posed a new threat”. He accordingly urged a review of border policy and security , including internal security, improvement of rail, road, air and wireless communications, policing and intelligence on the frontier, and territorial claims on India (Durga Das, 1973). The Sardar passed away soon thereafter. Nothing changed.

The historic Sino-Indian Treaty on Relations between India and the Tibet Region of China was signed in 1954. India gave up its rights in Tibet without seeking a quid pro quo. The Panch Shila was enunciated, which Nehru presumed presupposed inviolate boundaries in an era of Hindi-Chini Bhai Bhai.

The young Dalai Lama came to India in 1956 to participate in the 2500th anniversary celebrations commemorating the Enlightenment of the Buddha but was reluctant to return home as he felt China had reneged from its promise of Tibetan autonomy. Chou En-lai visited India later that year and sought Nehru’s good offices to persuade the Dalai Lama to return to Lhasa on the assurance of implementation of the 17 Point Agreement by China in good faith.

Visiting China in 1954, Nehru drew Chou En-lai’s attention to the new political map of India which defined the McMahon Line and the J&K Johnson Line as firm borders (and not in dotted lines or vague colour wash as previously depicted) and expressed concern over corresponding Chinese maps that he found erroneous. Chou En-lai replied that the Chinese had not yet found time to correct its old maps but that this would be done “when the time is ripe”. Nehru assumed this implied tacit Chinese acceptance of India’s map alignments but referred to the same matter once again during Chou’s 1956 visit to India. .

The matter was, however, not pressed. Nehru had in a statement about that time referred to the words of a wise Swedish diplomat to the effect that though a revolutionary power, China would take 20-30 years to fight poverty and acquire the muscle to assert its hegemony. Therefore it should meanwhile be cultivated and not be isolated and made to feel under siege as the Bolsheviks were in 1917. This postulate was, however, reversed in 1960-62 when Nehru interpreted the same wise Swedish diplomat to mean it was the first 20-30 years after its revolution that were China’s dangerous decades; thereafter the PRC would mature and mellow. This suggests a somewhat fickle understanding of China on Nehru’s part.

The Aksaichin road had been constructed by China by 1956-57 but only came to notice in 1958 when somebody saw it depicted on a small map in a Chinese magazine. India protested. The very first note in the Sino-Indian White Papers, published later, declared Aksaichin to be “indisputably” Indian territory ” and, thereafter, incredibly lamented the fact that Chinese personnel had wilfully trespassed into that area “without proper visas”. The best construction that can put on this language is that Nehru was even at that time prepared to be flexible and negotiate a peaceful settlement or an appropriate adjustment. Parliament and the public were, however, kept in the dark.

Though outwardly nothing had changed, Nehru had begun to reassess his position. According to his son Ashok Parthasarathi, his father, the late G. Parthasarathi met Nehru on the evening of March 18, 1958, after all concerned had briefed him prior to his departure for Peking as the new Indian Ambassador to China. GP recorded what Nehru said in these terms:

"So G.P. what has the Foreign Office told you? Hindi-Chini bhai bhai? Don't you believe it! I don't trust the Chinese one bit. They are a deceitful opinionated, arrogant and hegemonistic lot. Eternal vigilance should be your watch word. You shd send all your Telegrams only to me - not to the Foreign Office. Also, do not mention a word of this instruction of mine to Krishna. He, you and I all share a common world view and ideological approach. However, Krishna believes - erroneously - that no Communist country can have bad relations with any Non-Aligned country like ours".

This is an extraordinary account and is difficult to interpret other than, once again, as symbolising Nehru’s fickle views on China which GP had no reason to misquote.

Chinese incursions and incidents at Longju and Khizemane in Arunachal and the Kongka Pass, Galwan and Chip Chap Valleys in Ladakh followed through 1959. The Times of India broke many of these early stories. There was a national uproar. It was while on a conducted tour of border road construction in Ladakh in 1958 with the Army PRO, Ram Mohan Rao that I first heard vague whispers of “some trouble” further east. We however went to Chushul, where the air strip was still open, and beyond to the Pangong Lake unimpeded.

The Khampa rebellion in Tibet had erupted and the Dalai Lama fled to India in 1959 via Tawang where he received an emotional welcome. The Government of India granted him asylum along with his entourage and over100,000 refugees that followed and he took up residence with his government-in-exile in Dharamsala. These events greatly disturbed the Chinese and marked a turning point in Sino-Indian relations. Their suspicions about India’s intentions were not improved by Delhi’s connivance in facilitating American-trained Tibetan refugee guerrillas to operate in Tibet and further permitting an American listening facility to be planted on the heights of Nanda Devi to monitor Chinese signals in Tibet.

China had by now commenced its westward cartographic-cum-military creep in Ladakh and southward creep in Arunachal.

The highly regarded Chief of Army Staff, Gen.K.S. Thimayya began to envisage a new defence posture vis-à-vis China in terms of plans, training, logistics and equipment. However, Krishna Menon, aided by B.N. Mullick, the IB Chief and intelligence czar, who also was close to Nehru, disagreed with this threat perception and insisted that attention should remain focussed on Pakistan and the “anti-Imperialist forces”. Growing interference by Krishna Menon, now Defence Minister, in Army postings and promotions and strategic perspectives so frustrated Thimayya that he tendered his resignation to Nehru in 1959. Fearing a major crisis, the PM persuaded Thimayya to withdraw his resignation, which he unfortunately did at the cost of his authority. Nothing changed. Mullick and Menon sowed in Nehru’s mind the notion that a powerful Chief might stage a coup (as Ayub had done). This myth was for long a factor in Government’s aversion to the idea of appointing a Chief of Defence Staff.

President Ayub of Pakistan had on a brief stopover meeting with Nehru in Delhi en route to Dhaka in 1959 had proposed “joint defence”. Joint defence against whom, was Nehru’s scornful and unthinking retort? Yet Nehru was not unconscious of a potential threat from the north as he had from the early 1950s repeatedly told Parliament that the Himalayan rampart was India’s defence and defence line. He had somewhat grandiloquently and tactlessly proclaimed that though Nepal was indeed a sovereign nation, when it came to India’s security, India’s defence lay along the Kingdom’s northern border, Nepal’s independence notwithstanding! Yet he had been remarkably lax in preparing to defend that not-quite-so- impenetrable a rampart (as I had argued in an article in the Times of India in 1950) or even countenance his own military from doing so.

However, almost a decade later, Himalayan border road construction commenced under the Border Roads Organisation and forward positions were established. This Forward Policy, though opposed by Lt Gen. Daulat Singh, GOC-in-C Western Command, was pushed by Krishna Menon, de facto Foreign Minister, and equally by B.N Mullick, who played a determining role in these events, being present in all inner councils. Many of the 43 new posts established in Ladakh were penny packets with little capability and support or military significance. The objective appeared more political, in fulfilment of an utterly fatuous slogan Nehru kept uttering in Parliament and elsewhere, that “not an inch of territory” would be left undefended though he had earlier played down the Aksaichin incursion as located in a cold, unpopulated, elevated desert “where not a blade of grass grows”. In August Nehru announced that Indian forces had regained 2500 square miles of the 12,000 square miles occupied by the Chinese in Ladakh.

A series of Sino-Indian White Papers continued to roll out. The Times of India commented on August 15, 1962: Anyone reading the latest White Paper on Sino-Indian relations together with some of the speeches by the Prime Minister and Defence Minister on the subject may be forgiven for feeling that the Government’s China policy, like chopsuey, contains a bit of everything – firmness and conciliation, bravado and caution, sweet reasonableness and defiance…We have been variously informed …that the situation on the border is both serious and not so serious; that we have got the better of the Chinese and they have got the better of us; that the Chinese are retreating and that they are advancing…”.

Backseat driving of defence policy continued to the end of Thimayya’s tenure when General P.N.Thapar was appointed COAS in preference to Thimayya’s choice of Lt. Gen S.P.P Thorat, Eastern Army Commander. Thorat had produced a paper in the prevailing circumstances advocating that while the Himalayan heights might be prepared as a trip-wire defence, NEFA should essentially be defended lower down at its waist which, among other things, would ease the Indian Army’s logistical and acclimatisation problems and correspondingly aggravate those of the Chinese. The Thorat plan, “The China Threat and How to Meet It”, got short shrift.

The Goa operation at the end of 1960 witnessed two strange events. The new Chief of General Staff (CGS), Lt. Gen. B.M Kaul marched alongside one of the columns of the 17th Division under Gen Candeth that was tasked to enter Goa. Thereafter he and, separately, the Defence Minister, Krishna Menon, declared “war” or the commencement of operations at two different times: one at midnight and the other at first light the next morning. In any other situation such flamboyant showmanship could have been disastrous. However, Goa was a cake walk and evoked the mistaken impression among gifted amateurs in high places that an unprepared Indian Army could take on China.

Kaul’s promotion to the rank of Lt. Gen and then to key post of CGS had stirred controversy. He was politically well connected and had held staff and PR appointments but was without command experience. The top brass was divided and the air thick with intrigue and suspicion. Kaul had inquiries made into the conduct of senior colleagues like Thorat, S.D Verma and then Maj.Gen. Sam Manekshaw, Commandant of the Staff College in Wellington !

Even as the exchange of Sino-Indian notes continued, Nehru on Oct 12, 1962 said he had ordered the Indian Army “to throw the Chinese out”, something casually revealed to the media at Palam airport before departing on a visit to Colombo!

A new 4 Corps was created on October 8, 1962 with headquarters at Tezpur to reinforce the defence of the Northeast. Lt Gen Harbaksh Singh was named GOC but was soon moved to take over 33 Corps at Siliguri and then moved again to the Western Command. Kaul took charge of 4 Corps but appeared to have assumed a superior jurisdiction because of his direct political line to Delhi. Command controversies were further compounded as at times it seemed that both everybody and nobody was in charge. Thapar himself and Gen L.P. Sen, now at Eastern Command, also went to recce and reorder defence plans along the Bomdila-Se La sector. At the political level and at the External Affairs Ministry the adage was “Panditji knows best”.

Kaul was here, there and everywhere, exposing himself in high altitudes without acclimatisation. No surprise that he fell ill and was evacuated to Delhi on October 18 only to return five days later.

Following Nehru’s “throw them out” order, and against saner military advice and an assessment of ground realities, a Brigade under John Dalvi was positioned on the Namka Chu River below the Thagla Ridge that the Chinese claimed lay even beyond the McMohan Line. It was a self -made trap. It was but to do or die. The Brigade retreated in disorder after a gallant action, while the Chinese rolled down to Tawang which they reached on October 25.

The London Economist parodied Kipling. A text of a pithy editorial titled “Plain Tales from the Hills” read, “When the fog cleared, The Chinese were there”! That said it all. A new defence line was hurriedly established at Se La.

I was not in the country during the Namka Chu battle but returned soon thereafter and was asked to go to Tezpur from Bombay to cover the war.

Nehru was by now convinced that the Chinese were determined to sweep down to the plains. The national mood was one despondency, anger, foreboding. Only one commentator, the Times of India editor, N.J.Nanporia, who sadly just passed away a few weeks ago, got it right. In a closely reasoned edit page article he argued that the Chinese favoured negotiation and a peaceful settlement, not invasion, and India must talk. At worst the Chinese would teach India a lesson and go back. Critics scoffed at Nanporia. I too thought he was being simplistic. A week or 10 days later, in response to his critics, he reprinted the very same article down to the last comma and full-stop. Events proved him absolutely right.

On October 24, Chou En-lai proposed a 20 kilometre withdrawal by either side. Three days later Nehru sought the enlargement of this buffer to 40-60 km. On November 4, Chou offered to accept the McMahon Line provided India accepted the Macdonald Line in Ladakh approximating the Chinese claim line (giving up the more northerly Johnson Line favoured by Delhi).

I was by now in Tezpur, lodged in the very pleasant Planter’s Club which had become a media dormitory. The Army arranged for the press to visit the NEFA front. Scores of Indian and foreign correspondents and cameramen volunteered. Col Pyara Lal, the chief Army PRO, took charge. On November 15-17 we drove up to Se La (15,000 feet) and down to Dirang Dzong in the valley beyond before the climb to Bomdila. Jawans in cottons and perhaps a light sweater and canvas shoes were manhandling ancient 25-pounders into position at various vantage points. We had seen and heard Bijji Kaul’s theatrics and bravado at 4 Corps Headquarters a day earlier and were shocked to see the reality: ill-equipped, unprepared but cheerful officers and men digging in to hold back the enemy under the command of a very gallant officer, Brig Hoshiar Singh.

We had barely returned to Tezpur on Nov 17 when we learnt that the Chinese had mounted an attack on Se La and outflanked it as well. Many correspondents rushed back to Delhi and Calcutta more easily to file their copy and despatch their pictures and footage. Military censorship delayed transmission. I discovered later that between the Tezpur PO’s inability to handle much copy and censorship, few if any of my despatches reached the Times of India and those that did had been severely truncated.

Even as battle was joined, Kaul, disappeared from Tezpur to be with his men, throwing the chain of command into disarray. The saving grace was the valiant action fought by Brigadier Navin Rawley at Walong in the Luhit Valley before making an orderly retreat, holding back the enemy wherever possible. Much gallantry was also displayed in Ladakh against heavy odds.

The use of the air force had been considered. Some thought that the IAF had the edge as its aircraft would be operating with full loads from low altitude air strips in Assam unlike the Chinese operating from the Tibetan plateau at base altitudes of 11,000-12,000 feet. However, the decision was avoid use of offensive air power to prevent escalation (which Marshal of the Air Force, Arjan Singh, and the current Air Chief, Air Marshal NAK Browne, have recently criticised).

On November 18, word came that the Chinese had enveloped Se La, which finally fell without much of a fight in view of conflicting orders. A day later the enemy had broken through to Foothills (both a place name and a description) along the Kameng axis. Confusion reigned supreme.

Kaul or somebody ordered the 4^th Corps to pull back to Gauhati on Nov 19 and, as military convoys streamed west, somebody else ordered that Tezpur and the North Bank be evacuated. A “scorched earth” policy was ordered by somebody else again and the Nunmati refinery was all but blown up. The DM deserted his post. A former school and college mate of mine, Rana KDN Singh, was directed to take charge of a tottering administration. He supervised the Joint Steamer Companies, mostly manned by East Pakistan lascars, as they ferried a frightened and abandoned civil population to the South Bank. The other modes of exodus were by bus and truck, car, cart, cycle and on foot. The last ferry crossing was made at 6 p.m. Those who remained or reached the jetty late, melted into the tea gardens and forest.

The Indian Press had ingloriously departed the previous day, preferring safety to real news coverage, - as happened again in Kashmir in 1990, when at least women journalists subsequently redeemed the profession. Only two Indians remained in Tezpur, Prem Prakash of Visnews and Reuters, and I, together with nine American and British correspondents. Along with us, wandering around like lost souls, were some 10-15 patients who had been released from the local mental hospital.

That was the most eerie night I have every spent. Tezpur was a ghost town. We patrolled it by pale moonlight on the alert for any tell-tale signs or sounds. The State Bank had burned its currency chest and a few charred notes kept blowing in the wind as curious mental patients kept prodding the dying embers. Some stray dogs and alley cats were our only other companions.

Around midnight, a transistor with one of our colleagues crackled to life as Peking Radio announced a unilateral ceasefire and pull back to the pre-October “line of actual control”, provided the Indian Army did not move forward. Relieved and weary we repaired to our billet at the abandoned Planter’s Club whose canned provisions of baked beans, tuna fish and beer (all on the house) had sustained us.

Next morning, all the world carried the news, but AIR still had brave jawans gamely fighting the enemy as none had had the gumption to awaken Nehru and take his orders as the news was too big to handle otherwise! Indeed, during the preceding days, everyone from general to jawan to officials and the media, but everyone, was tuned into Radio Peking to find out what was going on in our own country. Satyameve Jyate! But even today we still lack a coherent communications policy.

1962 was a politically-determined military disaster. President Radhakrishnan said it all when he indicted the Government for its “credulity and negligence”. Nehru himself confessed, artfully using the plural, “We were getting out of touch with reality … and living in an artificial world of our own creation”. Yet he was reluctant to get rid of Krishna Menon, (making him, first, Minister for Defence Production and then Minister without Portfolio, in which capacity he brazenly carried on much as before). Public anger finally compelled the PM to drop him altogether or risk losing his own job.

Nehru was broken and bewildered. His letter to John F Kennedy seeking US military assistance after the fall of Bomdila was abject and pathetic. He feared that unless the tide was stemmed the Chinese would overrun the entire Northeast. He said they were massing troops in the Chumbi Valley and he apprehended another “invasion” from there. If Chushul was overrun, there was nothing to stop the Chinese before Leh. The IAF had not been used as India lacked air defence for its population centres. He therefore requested immediate air support by twelve squadrons of all-weather supersonic fighters with radar cover, all operated by US personnel. But US aircraft were not to intrude into Chinese air space.

One does not know what and whose inputs went into drafting Nehru’s letter to Kennedy. Non-alignment was certainly in tatters.

Tezpur limped back to life. On November 21, Lal Bahadur Shastri, the Home Minister, paid a flying visit on a mission of inquiry and reassurance. He was followed the next day by Indira Gandhi. Nehru had meanwhile broadcast to the nation, and more particularly to “the people of Assam “to whom his “heart went out” at this terrible hour of trial. He promised the struggle would continue and none should doubt its outcome. Hearing the broadcast in Tezpur, however, it did not sound like a Churchillian trumpet of defiance. Rather, it provided cold comfort to the Assamese many of whom hold it against the Indian state to this day that Nehru had bidden them “farewell”.

I remained in Tezpur day after day for a month waiting day after day for the administration to return to Bomdila. This it did under the Political Officer (DM), Major K.C. Johorey just before Christmas. I accompanied him. The people of NEFA had stood solidly with India and Johorey received a warm welcome.

Thapar had been removed and Gen J.N Chaudhuri appointed COAS. Kaul went into limbo. The Naga underground took no advantage of India’s plight. Pakistan had been urged by Iran and the US not to use India’s predicament to further its own cause and kept its word. But it developed a new relationship with China thereafter.

The US and the West had been sympathetic to India and its Ambassador, Galbraith, had a direct line to Kennedy. However, the US was also preoccupied with growing Sino-Soviet divide and the major Cuban missile crisis that boiled over in October 1962.

The COAS, Gen Choudhury ordered an internal inquiry into the debacle by Maj. Gen Henderson Brooks and Brigadier P.S Bhagat. The Henderson Brooks Report remains a top-secret classified document though its substance was leaked and published by Neville Maxwell who served as the London Times correspondent in India in the 1960s, became a Sinophile and wrote a critical book titled “India’s China War”. The Report brings out the political and military naiveté, muddle, contradictions and in-fighting that prevailed and failures of planning and command. There is no military secret to protect in the Henderson Brooks Report; only political and military ego and folly to hide. But unless the country knows, the appropriate lessons will not be learnt.

India did not learn the lesson that borders are more important than boundaries and continued to neglect the development of Arunachal and North Assam lest China roll down the hill again. However, given the prevailing global and regional strategic environment and India’s current military preparedness, the debacle of 1962 will not be repeated.

Many have since recorded their versions of what happened in 1962 : Kaul, Dalvi, D.K (Monty) Palit (who served under Kaul as Director of Military Operations), Neville Maxwell, S Gopal in Volume III of his Nehru biography, S.S. Khera, Principal Defence Secretary and Cabinet Secretary, in his “India’s Defence Problem”, Y.B Chavan, as retold in his biography by T.V.Kunhi Krishnan, and others. Each has a tale to tell. But the truth, differently interpreted though widely suspected, remains the greatest casualty of 1962.

'A message for Mr Nehru's ears only'

Kishan S Rana

Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai made efforts at rapprochement but the scars of the 1962 war ran too deep for the Indian PM

India-China relations in the past 50 years have been marked by a paradox. While India still carries scars of the 1962 border war, China hugely underestimated for many years the impact of the war on India. This second of three articles* looks at the Beijing diplomatic discourse in the immediate aftermath of 1962.

P K Banerjee (PKB) headed the Indian Embassy in Beijing from June 1961 to December 1963; his book My Peking Memoirs of The Chinese Invasion of India, (Clarion, Delhi, 1990) has received far less attention than it deserves; it details Chinese efforts to engage India in political dialogue.

 PKB had seven substantive meetings with Premier Zhou, between the outbreak of the border war and 1963, besides his farewell call. (Interestingly, the Chinesecharge d’affaires in New Delhi was not a communication channel.) On October 24, Premier Zhou received PKB; the atmosphere was “definitely chilly”. PKB writes, “He then said that the conflict had to stop, it had to end! He had therefore written a letter to Mr Nehru with three proposals: 1) the two countries should immediately agree to respect ‘the line of actual control’, and their armed forces should disengage and withdraw 20 km from this line; 2) the Chinese troops in the eastern sector would withdraw north of the line of actual control; 3) the prime ministers of the two countries should meet to seek a friendly and peaceful settlement.”

In reply PKB presented the Indian viewpoint, adding: “…China had agreed in 1960, when Zhou had visited New Delhi, to maintain the status quo in the NEFA [North East Frontier Agency] area. At this point he interrupted me sharply by saying that it was not true; he had never given such an assurance.” On November 19 and 20, PKB had two more meetings with Zhou.

In December 1962, PKB was instructed to come to Delhi for the Sri Lankan prime minister’s visit; the six non-aligned mediator “Colombo Powers” – Burma, Cambodia, Egypt, Ghana, Indonesia and Sri Lanka – had advanced proposals to ease India-China tensions. This was PKB’s first visit to Delhi during the assignment. Little wonder PKB felt he did not understand New Delhi’s thinking.

On January 7, 1963, PKB was summoned, told that he should come alone. PKB writes: “He [Zhou] was in a pensive mood and somewhat tired, and said… he would like me to carry his very personal and verbal message only for Mr Nehru’s ears. He continued that war never solved any problems but only created new ones… positive steps were urgently required besides public declarations and political statements. Mr Nehru, a man of high philosophy and great vision, and he had known each other personally over a period of many years [sic]. He understood Mr Nehru’s current political predicaments but Mr Nehru should try and understand his (Chou En-lai’s) position as well. Mr Nehru should help Mr Chou En-lai’s hand, and a hand extended in friendship and cooperation…1) for the next three months, Mr Nehru and he would stop making negative statements about each other’s country although this may not stop others from making statements of counter-productive nature. 2) Mr Nehru and he should meet as soon as possible with only a small entourage, away from the press and publicity, in an agreed place, in order to exchange ideas for an agreed and joint action to defuse the current situation. This meeting in total privacy should last no longer than two days. 3) After this meeting, which would further ensure in every way the strengthening of the cease-fire line, the two governments would draw up a program where they could jointly cooperate in areas like trade, science, culture and technology… When the climate for mutual trust had been created, then the border disputes would be discussed, on a sector to sector basis, by the two countries… He requested me again to give this strictly private and personal message directly to Mr Nehru.”

PKB decided to tell no one in Delhi about the content of Zhou’s message, not even Foreign Secretary M J Desai. He met Nehru several times: “[Nehru] wanted me to go with him to his office in South block. In the car he… was mumbling to himself, “What went wrong, where did I go wrong?” During my stay in New Delhi, I was with Mr Nehru a number of times, and used to hear this type of monologue… [Some days later, at the prime minister’s residence] He asked me about the message sent by Chou En-lai… immediately after the meeting with Chou, I had myself typed out so that no point might be missed… I gave him the one-page typed message which I carried constantly with me inside my wallet. He started reading it… going over it a few times. He then put down the paper on the table near him and seemed lost in thought… He returned from his thoughts, looked at me and said that it was not possible since matters had gone too far. He added that during my stay I had met members after government and the opposition, press people, as well as ordinary citizens, and surely I must’ve reached the same conclusion that no one in India would stand anymore Chinese bluff and all nonsense. He briefly recalled his efforts to help China with goodwill and friendship, and his close association with Chou En-lai, whose betrayal had led to fraudulent territorial claims by China and the invasion off India. He gave descriptions of meetings and details of discussions and negotiations with Chou En-lai. It was a melancholy monologue… [At a meeting some days later] He asked me if I had mentioned or shown the substance of Chou En-lai’s message to anyone. I said that I had not. He struck a match, and held the paper to the flames and burnt it over a large crystal ash-tray. He said that from the Indian side it would take more than a quarter of a century to return to any substantive negotiation, provided the Chinese refrained from another attack on India.”

PKB returned to Beijing on January 28, 1963, and was summoned to meet Premier Zhou a few days later. “He asked whether I had given his verbal message to Mr Nehru personally and wanted to know the response. I told him briefly about the current atmosphere in India, and gave him an outline of Mr Nehru’s reply, namely, that as a first step, China should, like India, except the Colombo proposals in toto. India had announced her acceptance on January 27.

After China’s acceptance in toto and after the required implementation was completed by both countries, the second step would be to discuss other matters. Chou En-lai was visibly excited, if not angry, and said he had done everything within his power and that India would be responsible for future stalemates and complications. He said that he would now write formally to Mr Nehru on the matter.”

PKB had three more meetings with Zhou in 1963, but efforts at dialogue were over. On December 17, 1963, Zhou, unusually, received PKB for a farewell call; I was one of four officials that accompanied him. In a cordial mood, Zhou said he was sorry to see PKB leave and invited him to come again as his guest. About a year later, China was immersed in the Cultural Revolution. The Chinese premier never received any other Indian resident envoy. India next surfaced in Beijing’s agenda with Mao’s 1970 May Day gesture — an event that also produced its misreading, but that is for another day.

 The first article “Battle lines of the 1962 war” appeared on September 17. The writer is a former ambassador, author, teacher and honorary fellow at Institute of Chinese Studies, Delhi

kishanrana@gmail.com 

The views expressed and Information provided by the author are his own and left to public to judge and rationalise for themselves.