A Chief of Defence Staff for India – A Contrarian View

by Air Marshal 'Nana' Menon (Retd). 

There have been recent statements in the media about some progress being made towards the creation of a Chief of Defence Staff in India. If one were to read the opinions of many serving personnel and Veterans in blogs and other media, there appears to be a pervasive sense that the CDS is the panacea to many of the problems plaguing the rarified airs of Higher Defence Organisation, notwithstanding some assertions that it be treated only as a beginning. I have even more fundamental doubts and believe it will do the Services and the Country some good if the Armed Forces Community take a step back rather than rush in, ‘eyes wide shut’ into this proposal, as they did to the Sixth Central Pay Commission.

 Wide ranging internal debate, even if alien to the organizational ethos, may be necessary to avoid being re-organized into irrelevance. If not at the Staff or Operational levels, they must at least discuss it threadbare at the training institutions from DSSC to NDC. If past experience is any indication, discussions at apex levels often lead to self promotion and turf battles taking precedence over larger issues.

Admittedly, this is a lengthy subject much discussed and blogged, including calls for a Blue Ribbon Commission. I am neutral towards both Blue Ribbon Commission and the CDS but believe incremental changes with clear demarcation of responsibilities and greater levels of accountability may be a better approach in the Indian context. A few pointers to the international experience and to our two reports on the subject should be enough to raise some questions that could be discussed. A reading of the posts on Pragmatic Euphony on the subject could help those unaware of the post-Kargil report. Much less info seems to be available of the earlier CDE report.

CDS – The International Experience

Major international militaries having the CDS model are the UK, France and Australia. In the neighbourhood, SriLanka has one, with powers modified very recently. Others like the US have the Joint Chiefs/ COS Committee model. Traditionally there was almost a clear-cut Command/ Staff difference between the two models. Of late the differences have become more nebulous with each country defining it to suit their specific circumstances.

The only major conflict in which a CDS was to have been involved was the Falklands conflict in 1982. There were reports at the time that the CDS’s staff assessment was that the islands couldn’t be retaken, but Mrs. Margaret Thatcher went ahead on the advice of the First Sea Lord, Admiral Henry Leach and won the war. The CDS, also a naval officer, Admiral of the Fleet Terence Lewin had a lesser role. His being in New Zealand at the crucial time also led to some unkind comments.

 I may have missed something somewhere, but haven’t yet heard of a CDS winning a war anywhere.

Studies in India

One is aware of two reports that addressed the issue, the Committee on Defence Expenditure Report of 1993 and the post-Kargil GOM report. Interestingly, both were steered by Mr. Arun Singh. The CDE report of ' 93 was admittedly limited in scope and little information on that is available in the public space. It may be worthwhile to bring it into the public domain for some examination. More importantly, the CDE in 1993  reportedly recommended the creation of a Vice-Chief of Defence Staff as the Defence Secretary’s effective counterpart in the Service HQs, whereas the post-Kargil report effectively recommends the creation of a CDS and elevation of the Defence Secretary to a position above the CDS. I am curious to know what changed between the two reports to merit such drastic changes in hierarchical positions.

Unified Commands/Joint Operations

The major operations of WW II as well as many of the expeditionary wars since then, have demonstrated the need for joint operations. This is not contested. But I suspect that too many limited operations are now being made ‘joint’ just so that everyone can have a piece of the action. A military version of Parkinson’s Law – Operations expanding to keep available staff officers occupied. Major wars are hard to come by these days. Any opportunity to display perceived combat skills, or even better, to direct it from a safe distance, will be seized with alacrity.

One rarely discussed consequence of this approach is the escalation in costs of converting every operation into a 'joint' one. A less tangible, but even more important issue is the tendency to overlook the fact that individual Services are the products of the environments in which they operate, and the working ethos that comes of it. Admiral William Fallon would have been a perfectly competent CINCPAC, but as the first naval officer to command the land-centric CENTCOM, he did not seem to fit in. Differences with the Bush administration on Iran or alleged discomfort with his deputy, the high profile Gen. Petraeus may merely have aggravated the mismatch.

Entrusting the responsibility to the one most familiar with the environment, with others in a supporting role, may be the better option when the shooting match starts.

The irony for us is that on the one hand there is a push for tri-service action while on the other we under cut existing joint training at the National Defence Academy, by the Navy opting out of a part of it. On the other hand, the rotational appointment of CinC Andaman Command may have done no harm for Tsunami or earth quake relief, but what happens in a maritime environment in the fog of war may not be everyone’s cup of tea.

Allocation of Responsibilities

As seen from  international experience, the designation or protocol is much less important than the duties and responsibilities assigned. Surprisingly, the post Kargil report makes no reference to the ‘Rules of Business of GOI’ or to the ‘Manual of Office Procedure’, both relevant to the allocation of  duties and responsibilities in the government. With the result, the Joint Staff and individual Service HQs have since been jostling for space and to hold on to what each had. Little has moved from the Defence Secretary to the CISC.

 Of course the other interesting part of the report, much less commented upon,  is the  ‘elevation’ in the role of the Defence Secretary. In keeping with the colonial hangover, the roles of CDS and DefSec were borrowed from UK. The CDS, as in the UK, is recommended to be the ‘Principal Military Advisor’, but the DefSec’s role from being the ‘Principal Civilian Advisor on Defence’(as in the UK) has been enlarged as “The Principal Defence Advisor’, implicitly placing him above CDS. Another key aspect that seems to be missing in comparison to the UK model is that there is no mention of the Chiefs of Staff  and the CDS having direct access to the Prime Minister.

 While the UK model may or may not be suitable, an explanation for the changes made from the chosen model as well as reasons for not including the Service Hqs in the Rules of Business/Manual of Office Procedure could be enlightening.

 Perhaps formal direct allocation (rather than whimsical delegation by MOD) of responsibilities/accountability to the Service HQs and CISC (as applicable to other arms of the government) may be a better option in our circumstances. Also whether it is Kargil or 26/11, our big problem seems to be in fixing responsibility. To that extent, the Service Chiefs being the Cs-in-C of their respective Services may yield more accountability than the 'theatre command' model as in the US. Another issue requiring attention is the qualification of the Principal Civilian Adviser on Defence? Does it need any, or is the job so inconsequential as to be filled in by an amateur in a round of musical chairs? Even if the intent is to reserve the post to the Civil Services, doesn't someone from the Foreign Service or the Defence Accounts Service have greater exposure to 'Defence' issues?

Let us also remember that all UK reorganizations in the recent past have been to cater for a diminishing role in world affairs. Is that the route India's Strategic Community wants to take now ?