by Kunal Verma
"Let us not get carried away by
what can at best be described as sentimental hogwash"-- General
(Retd) VK Singh
The 50th Anniversary of the Indo-China War has
evoked a feeling of anger not so much at the Chinese, but towards our own
leadership that failed the country in the most shocking manner. Amidst the
groundswell of emotion that swept through television channels and the media,
the Ministry of Defence could not take the risk of continuing to tow the
Congress dominated line of ignoring the 1962 War. Finally, fifty years after
Chinese mortars had shattered the morning stillness on the Namka Chu on October
20, 1962, our own bugles played the last post at the Amar Jawan Jyoti at India
Gate. In a symbolic gesture that has far reaching ramifications, the three
Service Chiefs and the Defence Minister, finally lined up and saluted the dead!
Since Independence, the Indian soldier has been
called upon time and again to clear the mess, usually at the point of the
bayonet, that has been made by our bungling civilian leadership. The examples
are endless: the ceasefire in 1949 when Indian troops were poised to regain the
whole of Jammu and Kashmir; the Tashkent Agreement returning to Pakistan vital
posts like Haji Pir and Black Rock in Kargil in 1965; the repatriation of
93,000 POWs to Pakistan in 1971 without ensuring the return of a handful of our
own men (some of whom are still languishing in Pakistani jails); the list can
be quite exhaustive. Now, ironically, as we mourn our dead in NEFA (now
Arunachal Pradesh) and Ladakh, the Government is poised to add yet another
feather in its cap of bungles. Quite frankly, if the latest PMO initiative on
the so-called demilitarization of the Siachen Glacier is pushed through, it
could well be the mother of all bungles!
After its obsession with Kashmir since 1947,
Siachen has been the biggest bone that is stuck in Pakistan’s throat since it
lost the glacier to the Indian Army in 1984. For years, talks between the two
countries had been held on the issue and after the Kargil War in 1999, the
situation on the ground had more or less stabilized itself. Then most
incredibly, since November 2011, rumours of an impending settlement on Siachen
began to surface. Then the odd articles began to sporadically appear in the
media, mainly questioning the wisdom of having gone into the area in 1984,
while focusing on the expense factor both material and in
terms of human lives always implying that India was sitting on a wasteland that
had little or no strategic value.
All this time meetings between Indian and Pakistani
Track II members were indeed being held to discuss various CBMs, among which
Siachen was a key issue. Dubai (September 2011), Bangkok (February), Chiang Mai
(April) and Palo Alto (July) preceded the Lahore meeting on 23-25 September
where a formal agreement to demilitarize Siachen was inked. That the Lahore
delegation was acting on a predetermined brief was fairly obvious, for the
handshake was done despite the formal reservations of certain key members of
the delegation.
The Lahore agreement was more or less kept under
wraps, but the Atlantic Council of Canada that acted as a broker on Siachen let
the cat out of the bag. The composition of the Indian delegation was, to put it
mildly, incongruous for despite an impressive array of ranks (including a
retired Air Chief), none of the Army officers had ever served in the region.
The Pakistani side, on the other hand, was led by Jehangir Karamat, a former
Pakistan Army Chief who understands the strategic implications of the Siachen
region.
Says General VK Singh, who handed over charge of
the Indian Army earlier this year: Let us first be very clear as to who is
asking for this so-called demilitarization. The Pakistanis are not on the
Siachen Glacier, but are west of the Saltoro Range. Contrary to what they want
their own people to believe, they have a zero presence in Siachen. I wonder if
demilitarization will also result in Pakistan withdrawing from Baltistan,
pulling back to the west towards the Karakoram Highway? Until recently, they
had even refused to accept the AGPL for verification of who is where. It is
ludicrous that in such circumstances we are talking of demilitarization and
withdrawal. Our troops are well established and administratively well off so
what is the rational to pull them out of the area?
Lt General PC Katoch, a former commander of the
Siachen Brigade adds: For decades, India has always distrusted the Atlantic
Council, which is perceived to be in bed with the Pakistani military. In this
arrangement Pakistan has grabbed the strategic opportunity to attain all its
key goals. It is surmised that the PM is aiming for a Nobel Peace Prize to
recover the legitimacy his Government has lost after a succession of scandals.
Post the Shimla Agreement in 1972, the delineation
of the LC between India and Pakistan extended up to NJ 9842. Beyond this, the
two sides agreed that the LC would run henceforth to the north. This clearly
implied that the boundary would follow the ridgeline to the north along the
Saltoro, but subsequently both Pakistani and USAF maps later drew a lateral
line from NJ 9842 directly to the KK Pass which implied that the area belonged
to Pakistan. A subsequent mountaineering expedition to Siachen found plenty of
evidence of activity east of the Saltoro. Given the extreme conditions in what
was at the time often referred to as the ‘Third pole’ the Indian Army pulled
off one of the most innovative and daring operations by pre-empting the
Pakistani Army which was rushing to occupy the heights that would dominate the
glacier.
Having been beaten at their own game (as
acknowledged even by Musharaff in his book) the Pakistani Army subsequently
succeeded in establishing a foothold on the 22,143 feet Qaid-e-Azam post, its
only real significant position on the Saltoro at the time. In 1987, in what
surely must rank as one of the most incredible military operations, men from 8
JAK LI pulled off the near impossible and wrested it from Pakistan. Re-named ‘Bana Top’ after
Subedar Bana Singh who led the attack, even today Pakistan does not acknowledge
its loss. After all the fighting on the glacier over the years, the bottom line
is that Pakistan has no worthwhile presence on the Saltoro!
Whether the Nobel Peace Prize is the ultimate
motivating factor or not, the general perception is that the PMO is acting
under US pressure to demilitarize Siachen. In Baltistan, Pakistan’s position is precarious, as its anti-Shia policies
over the years have alienated it from the local population. Most observers
believe that even maintaining its current position west of Saltoro is now
becoming untenable. Watchdog groups in the West, along with a few vernacular
Pakistani newspapers, have been regularly reporting on parleys to hand over the
disputed Gilgit-Baltistan region to China on a fifty-year lease. It is perhaps
pertinent to point out that the Shaksgam Valley (to the immediate north of the
Siachen region) was ceded to China by Pakistan in 1963 while the area to the
east was occupied by the PLA in 1962 to provide depth to the Western Highway.
In an ever-changing geo-political scenario, to look
at Siachen only from an India-Pakistan perspective is absurd, especially as Chinese
footprints over the entire Northern Areas are getting more and more obvious by
the day. From the US point of view the geo-political relationship between them
and Pakistan has always revolved around the Gilgit-Baltistan region. A counter
balance and a possible launching pad against Tibet (perceived to be China’s soft
underbelly) the Northern Areas have always been the hub around which the Great
Game was played. Talk of leasing the region to China cannot be lost on the
Americans, who would be desperate to keep Pakistan in Gilgit-Baltistan and keep
the Chinese out, especially as China is today also making serious attempts to
cut its way through the Wakhan corridor into Afghanistan. By getting India to
take a step back on Siachen, it gives the Pakistan leadership the incentive to
hold on to the region, for the border with north-western Ladakh, which is
currently static, becomes active again. In the guise of lace moves the
new situation sought to be thrust upon us is far more dangerous. India has
never understood the British concept of pushing its frontiers out, and has a
history of losing ground regularly. As Maroof Raza points out, Siachen has been
the one exception where India has gained ground since Independence.
Let us for the moment forget about everything else
demarcating positions, joint patrolling, CBMs et all, which are being talked
about in the Lahore Agreement. Let us just ask a simple question
demilitarization of Siachen will mean drawing up a new defensive line. Where
exactly is that supposed to be drawn? To fortify the area south of the Shyok
River means fortifying the entire Ladakh range, which would require at least
two divisions and would sooner or later make Leh, like Kargil town, a front
line target of enemy artillery guns. The Chinese pooh-pah the McMahon line on
the grounds that it was drawn up by the Tibetans and so it has no sanctity;
tomorrow if the region is leased to them, how do they care what was decided
with Pakistan!
Over the years, subsequent Army Chiefs, including
the current COAS General Bikram Singh, have categorically rejected the
demilitarization of Siachen. Says an incensed General VK Singh: Have
the proposers of such recommendations ever visited or stayed at the glacier or
the higher posts? Has our trust deficit with Pakistan disappeared? Please
remember what happened after PM Vajpaye's visit to Lahore. We must also be
clear on the implications of this to our stand on the Shaksgam Valley. Has the
government or the Track 2 team sent by it decided that we have no further claim
on POK? Let us not get carried away by what can at best be described as
sentimental hogwash.
A weak opposition that regularly fails to take on a
scandal-ridden Government on key issues be it nuclear power, FDI or whatever
and the growing perception that the PMO is simply doing what they are told to
do by the World Bank and the West with complete disregard to the interests of
the country is indicative of a complete policy vacuum. If the UPA II walks like
a duck, talks like a duck and behaves like a duck, it must be a duck and the
country must recognize it for what it is! The main trouble is, the egg that it
now lays in the last few days of its reign at the top can emerge as a monster
of epic proportions. The Government of India cannot be allowed to barter away
our control over Siachen in return for some nefarious political gain that it
might want to garner.
Kunal Verma is the author of The Long Road to Siachen: The Question Why and The Northeast Trilogy. A filmmaker, he has been professionally associated with the Armed Forces for over two decades. His films include The Standard Bearers (National Defence Academy), The Making of a Warrior (Indian Military Academy), Aakash Yodha (IAF), The Naval Dimension and Kashmir: Baramula to Kargil among others.
"Here then is the larger question. Can a
small cabal take such a monumental decision without involving the People,
Parliament and President of India? Can the PMO be allowed to barter away our
control over Siachen in return for some nefarious political gain or a ‘Nobel Prize’ These questions have to be asked and
satisfactorily answered if India is indeed a Democracy!" M G Devasahayam
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