Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw, the Army Chief during 1971 war, may have won all round accolades, but his operational and strategic thinking has come in for questioning from one of his junior commanders Lieutenant General J F R Jacob.
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In his autobiography, "An Odyssey in War and Peace", Lt Gen Jacob, then Chief of Staff of Eastern Army Command, has sought to fault Manekshaw along with some other Commanders for their role during the war in which India was instrumental in creation of Bangladesh.
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"Manekshaw based in Delhi, had little feel of the situation on the ground," Jacob has claimed in the book. He claims that Manekshaw had decided not to include capture of Dacca as one of the principal objectives of Indian operations.
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"I was flabbergasted...I was at complete loss to understand the concept underlying Manekshaw's operational thinking," Jacob says.
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"I maintained that it was imperative that we capture Dacca to control the whole of East Pakistan. Gen Manekshaw smiled at me, using his favorite term of endearment, 'Jake sweetie, don't you see that if we take Khulna and Chittagong, Dacca will automatically fall. There is therefore no need to take Dacca," writes Jacob.
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He further mentions how Manekshaw ordered broadcast of a message intercepted from Pakistan Navy, helping them change their wireless codes and leading to a failure of Indian code breaking operations.
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"The intercept indicated a rendezvous for river craft at Gupta Crossing on Meghna river. Manekshaw interpreted this to indicate that elements of Pakistan army were attempting to flee to Burma. He ordered Maj Gen Inder Gill (Director, Military Operations) to broadcast that he knew what they (Pakistani) were up to at Gupta Crossing," Jacob writes.
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"The broadcast was made and the Pakistan Navy immediately changed their code. Subsequently we were unable to read any further naval wireless traffic," he adds.
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Jacob further says, Manekshaw was "convinced" that China would attack India while no movement of Chinese troops was seen on the Tibetan Plateau and the intercepts of Chinese radio traffic also did not indicate any such plan by them.
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"Manekshaw was convinced that the Chinese would attack, a view he held right up to December 8, 1971," writes Jacob.
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On Manekshaw's relations with other service chiefs Jacob writes, "Unfortunately, the equation between the Army and Air Force Chiefs at Service Headquarters was less than cordial. The Army and Air Force Chiefs were not on speaking terms."
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On his equation with the then IAF Chief, Air Chief Marshal (ACM) P C Lall, Jacob says Manekshaw declined to talk to Lall on redrawing the boundaries of IAF commands at Shillong and Allahabad to ensure a better coordinated air raids on Pakistani posts in Bangladesh.
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Besides Manekshaw, Jacob has written about then Eastern Army Commander and his immediate senior Lt Gen Jagjit Singh Aurora.
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Referring to an incident when Manekshaw heavily criticised the Commanders believing they performed poorly in expediting Mukti Bahini operations in their sectors, Jacob writes, "The formation Commanders junior to him were aghast to see Aurora take the tray from waiter and serve drinks to D P Dhar (Prime Minister's adviser on Bangladesh) and Manekshaw."
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Jacob further alleges that Manekshaw ordered to change D-Day, when Indian forces were ordered to launch attacks on Pakistani positions inside Bangladesh, to December 4 as four was his 'lucky' number.
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On an amphibious operation ordered by Manekshaw without prior intimation at Cox's Bazar to prevent Pakistani forces escaping to Burma, the book says, "The operations ordered by Manekshaw, based on his assessment that Pakistani forces were withdrawing to Burma down the Arakan road, was a baseless conjecture not supported by any intelligence."
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"These specialised operations should not be mounted and launched in the cavalier manner ordered by Manekshaw in the name of the chiefs of staff at Delhi," Jacob writes.
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The author has also elaborated the personality clashes between the officers, including Manekshaw and Aurora, which "adversely affected the passage of orders and their implementation".
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"Aurora did not get on with Mohan Thapan who was commanding 33 Corps in North Bengal; they were not on speaking terms. Aurora wanted a cinema to be named after him at the 33 Corps HQ and Thapan had refused," he writes.
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"Another Corps commander, General-Officer-Commanding (GOC) 4 Corps Lt Gen Sagat Singh and Aurora initially got on well but relations deteriorated when Aurora learnt that Manekshaw disliked Sagat Singh," he says further.According to Jacob, Aurora got on well with the 2 Corps Commander Lt Gen 'Tappy' Raina who was on good terms with group of advisers close to Indira Gandhi.
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Manekshaw disliked the upright and outspoken Maj Gen Gurbax Singh Gill, the competent GOC of 101 Communication Zone, which led to Aurora turning hostile towards this officer. Lt Gen Raina had little or no control over his subordinate Maj Gen Dalbir Singh, the GOC of 9 Infantry Division, who openly flouted his orders.
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Lt Gen Sagat Singh did not get on well with two of his subordinate divisional commanders, Maj Gen B F Gonsalves and Maj Gen R D Hira of 57 and 23 Mountain Divisions respectively, Jacob says.
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He also writes about Manekshaw's professional relations with officers in Army Headquarters. "At Army HQ relations between Manekshaw and Maj Gen K K Singh, Director of Military Operation (DMO) till September 1971, were cordial. K K Singh was replaced by Maj Gen Inder Gill as acting DMO. Gill was an upright, competent, and outspoken officer, not a 'Yes' man, like others who Manekshaw liked to have around," he says.
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Jacob also mentions how both Manekshaw and Aurora were denied important posts in the central government by Gandhi. "Aurora approached Mrs Indira Gandhi, seeking to be appointed a governor. She declined. He then approached the Akali government in the Punjab, and they later arranged a seat for him in the Rajya Sabha," he mentions.
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According to him, Manekshaw had requested Gandhi to be appointed as the deputy chairman of the Planning Commission and seemed depressed when denied. "On one of my trips to Delhi, I went to see Manekshaw was staying in the MES Inspection Bungalow. He was sitting alone on the lawn and seemed depressed. He told me that he had requested Mrs Gandhi to appoint him deputy chairman of the Planning Commission, and that she had declined, offering him the post of High Commissioner to Canada instead," he writes.
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by Lieutenant General J F R Jacob In his autobiography, "An Odyssey in War and Peace", then Chief of Staff of Eastern Army Command,
JACOB AND SAM AND OTHERS
ReplyDelete1. I wonder if we cannot find many others who were around FM Sam, Gen Jacob, Gens Sagat, Thapan, Inder Gill, Raina, and all others named in the story. Now it is Jacob vs Sam. Those fellows who were Capts / Majors in Eastern Command, Army HQ, Hq 4 Corps, 33 Corps, 2 Corps, 101 Commn Zone etc, are still around very much, They would have witnessed / heard many things related to these statements by Jacob.
2. Has anyone else heard this story about ignoring Dacca? I know that the Eastern theatre Corps commanders were called to Mhow after they retired and addressed Higher Command / Senior Command courses about what happened and why. Surely this major decision of Sam would have found expression. Army officers would be able to clarify.
3. What about those of us from IAF who were junior staff officers in 1971? Anyone heard anything then?
anant bewoor
(A.G. Bewoor)
ag_bewoor@onwardgroup.com
JACOB AND SAM AND OTHERS
ReplyDeleteDear Veterans,
As an after thought one can find a lot of better ways of doings things. Gen Jacob had a lot of time since 71 to write and criticize when SAM was alive! Some thoughts on SAM are in the book "Born to Dare" a biography of Inder Gill. I was a 2 Lt in a Bn of 50(I) Para Bde. One of my sister Bn was dropped at Tangail to hasten the capture of Dacca. Gen Jacob was still mopping up at Khulna when Lt Gen Nirbhay Sharma(then a Capt)along with some more officers, was rushing in a jeep to hoist the Tricolour and the PARA Flags at Dacca!! which they did.
I have had to spend three days continuously with SAM in 1988 and found him to be a soldier and a human par excellence!! After all he was a human! SAM called Indira Gandhi a "Sweetie" let alone Jacob. My personal opinion is that Gen Jacob lacks the courage of conviction to bring out all that is derogatory when a man is not alive and more so when he had all these years to do so before SAM called it a day!
Best Wishes
BGV
Lt Col BGV Kumar
bgv_kumar@yahoo.com
Dear CKS,
ReplyDeleteComing back to the main article about FM Manekshaw.
I for one find no reason to disbelieve Lieutenant General J F R Jacob. He is very convincing.
If what he says is true do you feel Manekshaw deserved the rank of FM?
Has there been an error of judgement?
Mohan Raj
crmohanraj@yahoo.com
Thes comments are in two parts.
ReplyDeletePart - 1
Dear CKS,
I was AD Air Warfare at NHQ when 71 war was being planned. I remember 25 March when Mujib was jailed. News trickled down that IG wanted Indian army to march in. Sam Bahadur refused, and for a few good reasons. He wanted to go in after the northern passes were snow bound so that China could not interfere and he could use the northern troops in EP. He also did not want our armour to get bogged down during copious Bengal rains during monsoon. He wanted more equipment and ammo etc and time was needed for that. So, our planning started in March itself. Gen Jacob must have been in the know of things before operations started. He must have been part of the planning team. How come he carried out ops as planned (as COS of Eastern Command) but now he talks against them good 40 yrs later and when most of the main personalities are gone.
We came to know that it had to be a fast and decisive action, to be successfully completed before USA could intervene. So, the planning was to circumvent all major garrisons, cantonments and towns; to seal their harbours and prevent them from escaping. A very daring and original concept, we thought. Pakis also saw through this towards the end of the war and a race for Chittagong started. For two days there were radio announcements to assure Pakis that an honourable surrender was their only option and they would be honouarably treated. Then came the day when he announced on the radio that he had 'ordered his navy' to sink the 8 ships they had mustered in Chittagong harbour for escaping out of E Pakistan. The day after that INS VIKRANT launched a sortie of ten Seahawks armed with two 500 lbrs each. All the 8 ships were attacked and they received the bombs, resulting in big holes in the bottoms and they just sat down on the sea bottom next to the jetties they were tied to. One bomb missed the ship (which had been hit by the other bomb anyway) and landed on top of the shed across the jetty. There was a huge explosion as apparently it was full of recently off loaded arms and ammo.
To say that Sam was based in Delhi and (therefore) out of touch with realities on the ground is a very strange and silly logic to say the least.
This is the first time ever that I have heard of a Paki naval message being broadcast and that resulting in change of codes from their side. During the war I was sent to the ops rooms of the three services on almost daily basis. I never ever heard of such a thing. Unlike army and air force, the navy relies totally on electronic communications during peace and war. So, out of sheer necessity, navy is the best in electronic warfare, code breaking etc. We never experienced any such information blackouts during that war. IAF wanted to go in for daylight bombings by Canberras but we advised them against it. PAF still had a few operational fighters in EP and there was no sense in endangering our Canberras. We even told Air HQ where and in which hangars these a/c were located. Once we intercepted messages to say that the night raids had destroyed these a/c, we advised IAF that the sky was now fully open for them. That is how the services co-operated with each other. I wonder if any Canberra pilots remember that they could carry out daylight attacks only during the last few days. Till then it was only night attacks. We successfully intercepted their messages till the very end. Gen Jacob has erred here as he has while narrating (his version) of GHAZI's sinking.
K K Punchhi
Krishan K Punchhi
kkpunchhi@yahoo.ca
Part - 2 Follows
Part - 2
ReplyDeleteContinued from Part - 1
We heard that one condition laid down by Sam was that he would be the ultimate boss with IN and IAF working under him. There was no problem with Adm Nanda but ACM Lal did not take it kindly, though he had no choice. Nanda had a free hand to plan and execute naval ops, only keeping Sam informed. Lal had his problems, many of them, so we heard. Now you know how he used the words 'have ordered my navy'. I myself heard these words on the radio and chuckled. In any case, a signal had already gone out to VIKRANT asking her to sink these merchant ships.
I cannot comment on the relationship between various generals. All I can say is that we at NHQ never ever heard of these things, nor did our friends in Calcutta, Vizag or Madras !! Is Gen Jacob trying to tell us that he was the only wise one and a unifying force among all the fools? I wonder who is foolish. I wonder if he has praised any general of consequence in his book.
To the best of my knowledge, there was never any change in D Day. Never heard of such a thing then or even afterwards. Never heard that Sam was smitten by lucky numbers.
We never ever heard that Pak army personnel were trying to escape to Burma. To the best of my knowledge, only one gun boat with about 30 people escaped to Burma. It was attacked by Alize a/c but escaped.
The argument about re-drawing the boundaries of IAF command for better air warfare over EP makes no sense to me. The Navy transferred VIK plus a few more ships to the Eastern naval command (that too in Vizag, and not in Calcutta) and the opertions went off very well. With IAF, it would have been even easier. In any case, we never heard of this 'tussle' then. IAF just did not want to come 'under' the army. Navy had no problem. We were again 'indepenent' after the war. In any case, I believe Sam and Charles Nanda got along famously and Nanda had a free hand with the naval ops.
The amphibian landings at Cox's Bazaar came as a surprise to us too. I do not know the why and wherefor of this ops.
The Deputy Chairman of Planning Commission has always been an economist. I cannot imagine Sam trying to wangle this post. I think he would have been out of his depth in this job and I'm sure he knew about it. Therefore, I think here Jacob saheb has been very economical with truth and logic as he has with a few other points listed in your mail.
To imply that Sam was very friendly with a Kashmiri general who was close to IG is a very low grade idea. Is Jacob trying to take us back to the days of Nehru, Kaul and Thapar? Sam was never the one to curry favour, he was famous for this trait.
May I suggest you ask the then Sqn Ldr Jasjit Singh for his comments also. I think he was in Air HQ at that time. Inputs by others too should help. This mail is going to some BCC friends also.
Regards
K K Punchhi
Krishan K Punchhi
kkpunchhi@yahoo.ca
Thes comments by Col TN Raman are in two parts.
ReplyDeletePart - 1
Dear Veterans,
Lt Gen JFR Jacob, has been voicing his views for many years, even when FM Sam Manekshaw was alive. He has said the same things in his book, "Surrender at Dacca" published in 1997. What ever appearing in the Press now are not new. I find that all these remarks,( but for a very few like Gen Aurora taking the tray from a waiter to serve drinks himself), are from his Book published in 1997.
I will just quote one paragraph from the Book (page 154) where Gen Jacob states.
" I myself hold Sam Manekshaw in very high esteem. Despite differences in military assesments he was always kind, tolerant and considerate to me, for which I am for ever grateful.He was very popular with the rank and file and was respected by all. He was dedicated to the Army and upheld its dignity. As Army Chief and Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff during the 1971 war, the overall responsibility for operations was his. He bore this responsibility well and earned the honour he received. Sam can rightly take his place amongst the great leaders of Independent India "
The main points raised in the Article under discussion pertain to the overall war strategy. All Commanders & Political leadership had agreed that the campaign should be swift, not exceeding more than a week or 10 days.
Sam had three major worries. They were to haunt him through out the campaign.
a. Will the Chinese keep quiet in the North? This made him keep the 6 th Mountain Division, then located in North Bengal, in reserve for the defence of Bhutan. Only on 08 Dec 1971, he agreed to release two of its Brigades to the Eastern command, after making sure that the Chinese could not intervene, in an acceptable time frame, to thwart our attempts to liberate Bangladesh.
b. The second one was the likely American reaction in aid of Pakistan, which was their Pivotal ally in South Asia. As we all know now, the USA Seventh fleet was already ordered to Cordon off East Pakistan, but could not reach in time before the Indian Forces could enforce the Surrender.
c. The third and the biggest worry was about the UNO ordering a Cease Fire, half way through the campaign, thus creating a scenario akin to the Kashmir . Confirmation from Soviet Union was vital to ensure that they use their Veto power in the Security Council.
Veteran Raman
Col(Retd)TN Raman
ramantn sarma
colram40@yahoo.com
Part - 2
ReplyDeleteContinued from Part - 1
With this background, the initial strategy was to capture as many big towns in East Pakistan as possible, and install a Bangldesh Govt under the Mukthi Bahini on the captured territory. In fact such a strategy was also appreciated by the Pakistan High Command, which had already ruled out the capability of the Indian Army to overrun the East Pakistan. This miscalculation was to help our campaign immensely, because it forced Gen Niazi, the Commander of East Pakistan to disperse his forces through out the border towns, thus making the Capitol Dacca weak.
The final plan to capture Dacca, instead of isolating the same, was made only on the night 9/10 Dec 1971, because of the rapid advances our troops could make due to the excellent performance of our Corps of Engineers & the IAF. The Navy had also peaked at the right time with effective embargo of the entire coast of East Pakistan, including Khulna and Chittagong.
Jacob states that even as late as 13 Dec 1971, Dacca was not in the Agenda of Sam. This claim may be contentious. The decision to launch the 50 Parachute Brigade, to capture Dacca was taken somewhere around 9/10 Dec 1971. This was a joint operation. Therefore, the IAF would also have the record.
But, as far as my study goes, Jacob, right from the beginning wanted Dacca to be declared as the final objective. But his view was not supported by his own Commander, Lt Gen Arora.
This issue alone cannot be taken as a limitation of our commanders' thinking. In every campaign, the proper exploitation of initial tactical plan, becomes inevitable. In that, our Generals really stood out. Every opportunity was seized and capitalised. Within a span of three days they could shift the Centre of Gravity of the offensive to Dacca and also capture it.
Govt of India, late on 15 Dec 1971, had cleared the Invitation to lunch on 16 Dec 1971, given by Gen Niazi to Gen Jacob, at the Officers' Mess, HQ,East Pakistan Army, Dacca. Gavin Young of 'Observer', who also happened to be present for the lunch, captioned it as " The surrender Lunch" in his dispatch. It was a scoop for both- the Indian Armed Forces as well as the International Press.
Veteran Raman
Col(Retd)TN Raman
ramantn sarma
colram40@yahoo.com
JACOB AND SAM AND OTHERS
ReplyDeleteDear Friends,
In my humble opinion, Sam was completely right and Jake was just gung-ho regarding this bad idea. It is a pity Jake never got wise to his own mistake.
Fighting in a built up area is a bad idea militarily, besides a lot of damage to civilian infrastructure and civilians and unnecessary own casualties. The Pakis knew they had no chance and were prepared to surrender as Jake landed in Dacca to press Niazi to surrender, as correctly foreseen by Sam.
WWII in which both had served in should have given Jake the correct idea, Paris was declared a neutral city and the Germans vacated Paris - to prevent needless destruction of a great city. Contrast this with Stalingrad and Berlin which were reduced to rubble with tens of thousand of casualties on both sides and incl civilians.
In fact, Dacca as such had NO Strategic value at all. Hitler persisted in attacking Stalingrad despite any strategic importance because it was named after Stalin.
The entire German 6th Army under Colonel General von Paulus was sacrificed - the end of the German Eastern offensive , which was the beginning of the end for the Germans.
Napoleon, as a young Capt put in charge of the Republicans who had been beaten back repeatedly earlier by the Royalists at Toulon , instead of any attack, occupied a hill outside Toulon. From here he could fire his artillery on the British naval ships in Toulon harbour. who were supporting the Royalists. The ships had to withdraw, thereafter Toulon gave up the fight as they were cut off completely, once the British left.
Elsewhere also Jake's ideas about encryption and code breaking are clearly ill-informed, as codes are changed daily on a routine basis, one-pads are used for encryption, from message to message, for secret/ top secret messages.
Regards
Maurice Abel
maurice.s.abel@gmail.com
Dear Friends,
ReplyDeleteI would also add that Jake, as an artillery officer, like Napoleon, ought to have been familiar with the events at Toulon (which Napoeon correctly judged to be of no strategic importance, like Dacca). Jake was reputed also to be a student of military history, and an admirer of the Israeli campaigns from the 1940s onwards, in which they employed 'Liddell Hart's strategy of the indirect approach' and never launched attacks against a well defended objective, if it could be avoided.
Sam correctly applied this strategic principle to good effect.
Regards
Maurice Abel
maurice.s.abel@gmail.com
Dear CMs,
ReplyDeleteVeteran Raman writes,
"The main points raised in the Article under discussion pertain to the overall war strategy. All Commanders & Political leadership had agreed that the campaign should be swift, not exceeding more than a week or 10 days".
He goes on to write,
"With this background, the initial strategy was to capture as many big towns in East Pakistan as possible, and install a Bangldesh Govt under the Mukthi Bahini on the captured territory".
Luckily these ideas were not the eventual strategy employed. Instead our troops were allowed to bypass and envelope objectives, which were cut off and their contribution to the defence of East Pakistan was made insignificant. Sam as Jake suggests as per the article, did not adhere to this initial strategy.
Speed of our operations would have been hampered, if our troops were bogged down trying to capture strategically unimportant towns and suffered many casualties.
Speed of operations and capturing irrelevant ground are a distracting dichotomy, and against the basic principle of war, namely the 'Selection and Maintenance of Aim'.
Having two dichotomous Military Aims in battle is sheer folly.
Just as well for the successful final outcome, Sam ignored the politicians and their confused 'Aims', and ensured speed of ops, which requires that there are minimum casualties to own troops as well.
Incidentally, Dacca was not the only futile 'strategic' objective bypassed and cut off, and left to await surrender, e.g, Mynamati/Comila defences by Lt Gen Sagat Singh's 4 corps.
Regards
Maurice Abel
maurice.s.abel@gmail.com
Dear Veterans,
ReplyDeleteReference Veteran Maurice Abel's, remarks above. The initial strategy was what I had brought out in my study of the campaign. I had also mentioned that,
"This issue alone cannot be taken as a limitation of our commanders' thinking. In every campaign, the proper exploitation of initial tactical plan, becomes inevitable. In that, our Generals really stood out. Every opportunity was seized and capitalised. Within a span of three days they could shift the Centre of Gravity of the offencive to Decca and also capture it".
This was what happened as the campaign progressed. The initial Tactical as well as the Strategical plans did not foresee a walk over of our forces in the East Pakistan. I will also quote Air chief Marshal PC Lal, in "My Years with the IAF".
"Here I must clarify one doubt that has existed in my mind and also in the minds of others as to what the objectives of the 1971 war were. As defined by the Chiefs of Staff and by each respective service Chief, it was to gain as much ground as possible in the East to neutralise the Pakistani forces there to the extent we could and to establish a base as it were for a possible State in Bangladesh. The possibility that Pakistani Forces in the East Pakistan would collapse altogether as they did and that Dacca would fall and that the whole would be available to the leaders of the Freedom Movement in East Pakistan was not considered something that was likely to happen. Caution demanded that people commanding in the East should work to limited objectives but to go about achieving them as rapidly as possible. It was feared that a delay of even two or three weeks would inevitably bring in the UN Security Council and compel the two sides to come to some sort of Cease fire such as Kashmir. With that basic understanding between the three services, the Army , the Navy and the Air Force, they were left to plan their activities as they thought best".
Now, kindly go through my paper again.
Regards,
Veteran Raman
ramantn sarma
colram40@yahoo.com