by Sandeep Unnithan
The Indian army has held up the declassification of one of India's
most classified documents, the Henderson Brooks-Bhagat report. The report
submitted by Lieutenant General Henderson Brooks and then Brigadier Prem Bhagat
to the government in 1963 outlines the reasons for the defeat of the Indian
army in the 1962 border war with China.
Senior government officials told India Today that the army has
steadfastly maintained releasing the report was 'bad for morale'. Officials who
have read it say this is because the report squarely indictssenior army
generals for the country's worst-ever military defeat. Over
2000 officers and soldiers died and hundreds taken prisoners when the Chinese
simultaneously attacked Indian positions in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh in
October 20, 1962.
On 20th October 1962, a Bell 47G was lost on the Tsangdhar
ridge. Pilot was Sqn Ldr Vinod Kumar Sehgal with Major Ram Singh as crew. The
helicopter was on a rescue mission. The wreckage was captured by PRC forces.
The crux of the report in a 40-page summary by General Chaudhary
says the army gave a better account of itself in the Ladakh sector by resisting
the Chinese advance, because of better leadership. The three main findings of
the report are the failure of the army's higher command, the organization of
the army and finally the events leading to the appointment of the glib but
militarily unsound corps commander Lt General Brijmohan Kaul and his disastrous
handling of the defences of
north-eastern India.
The report blames the army's defeat in the north-east in the North
East Frontier Agency (present Arunachal Pradesh) on the higher echelons of the
Indian army. It explains why an entire division comprising over 15,000
soldiers, the 4th Infantry Division, collapsed in disarray and retreated from
its headquarters at Tawang; an infantry Brigade of over 3000 soldiers was
overrun by the Chinese and the Brigadier and several officers taken prisoner in
NEFA.
General Brooks lays the blame for these debacles in the North East
on the frequent changes in command. The responsibility for defending NEFA was
taken away from the less-pliant Lt General Umrao Singh who commanded the
Siliguri-based 33 Corps.
A new Tezpur-based 4 Corps was created and Lt General Kaul, then
Chief of General Staff in army headquarters, appointed to head it. Kaul fell
sick just before the conflict started but clung to his command and issued
instructions from his official residence 5 York Road (now 5 Motilal Nehru Marg,
the house of the Vice Chief of the IAF, in Delhi).
The other officer in the report's line of fire: Brigadier DK
Palit, the Director Military Operations, an acolyte of General Kaul who tried
to micro-manage the conduct of the war from DGMO, New Delhi.
Lieutenant General Brooks states in his preface that he has
specifically been directed not to look at the political events in the run up to
the war. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru is not mentioned but his appointee,
defence minister V Krishna Menon is implicated in the report. Menon played
favorites in the army, he propped one officer up against another.
Officials who have read the report are struck by its lucidity,
"Very frank and straight, not double-guessing what the bosses want to
hear", says one official. There is anguish over the catastrophic debacle.
The paper is now faded and yellowing 'like butterfly wings' says
an official who has read it, but the contents are as devastating today as they
were when it was submitted to then Indian army chief General JN Chaudhary in
1963. General Chaudhary replaced General VN Thapar who resigned a day after the
ceasefire in November 22, 1962.
Over the years, however, the report with its clinical analysis of
the conflict, has descended deeper into a well of secrecy. The report is part
of a list of secret documents handed over by one defence secretary to the next;
in the DGMO, it is held by Director- MO 1, a Colonel who heads the China
division. This tradition has continued for nearly five decades. It has never
been copied or taken out of South Block.
Army personnel who read it have to seek clearance at the highest
levels. A hand-written register maintains the list of all persons who have
accessed it. Successive governments have rebuffed numerous attempts made to get
the report declassified. In response to India Today's January 1, 2008
application for the report, army headquarters said it could not be revealed
because it is 'a Top Secret document vital to the security interest of the
State.'
Fernandes first agreed to table the report before parliament, but
did not do so. In response to a question, Defence Minister AK Antony told
parliament in 2008 that the contents of the report were part of an 'internal
study report' and that it was "not only extremely sensitive but of current
operational value."
In 2005, Nayar tried to get the report under under the Right to
Information Act. Sometime in 2006, then Chief Information Commissioner Wajahat
Habibullah, whose father had served as a General in the army, visited South
Block on a quiet Sunday and read one of the two copies of the report. The CIC
would decide, after reading the report, whether it could be put out in the
public domain. Habibullah later told a friend that he was extremely disturbed
by the contents.
It had named several army officers down the chain of command. In
March 2010, the government had its way. The CIC ruled that 'no part of the
Henderson Brooks report might at this stage be disclosed'. Author and historian
Claude Arpi author of 'The McMahon Line Saga' suggests the real reason the
report is not being declassified lies in a mistake made by the Indian army.
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