(Defence and Security Alert February 2013)
The word ‘jointness’ does
not appear in most English dictionaries. It is of recent origin and to the
United States goes the credit for coining this expression which implies ‘the
integration of the strengths of at least two limbs of the military in a coordinated
effort to achieve a common goal’. It is often mistakenly considered to be
synonymous with integration and unification. Whereas unification implies merger
of separate entities into an amalgamated organisation with a single chain of
command, integration allows entities to retain their separate identity while
operating as a single body with well spelt-out hierarchy.
The concept of jointness is still evolving and is central to the
emerging Network Centric Warfare, wherein real-time information is made
available to all components of a force. The United States considers joint
operations integrated by common information networks to be of paramount
criticality in its domination of the global war zones.
Jointness in military operations validates the well-known principle of
war ‘economy of effort’, implying thereby that a balanced force with the
optimum punch should be concentrated at the most vital point. It precludes
wastage of resources by using an appropriate mix of force capabilities
contributes to achieving the necessary leverage against the opponent.
Major
General Mrinal Suman
While joint operations have become the standard
form of waging war by all the armed forces, Canada is the only major country to
attempt integration/unification of the three services. Through the
enactment of theCanadian
Forces Reorganisation Act of February 1968, the navy, the
army and the air force were merged into a single service called the Canadian
Armed Forces.
Passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of
Defence Reorganisation Act of 1986 (GNA) is generally considered to be the
harbinger of the currently ongoing Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). The
act aimed at achieving optimum operational effectiveness by ensuring cross
service cooperation in all stages of the military processes. RMA precludes
segregated service-wise operations.
Jointness means conducting integrated military
operations with common strategy, methodology and conduct. It entails evolution
of joint equipment policy and acquisition plans; joint planning, development of
doctrine and policy-making; joint training; integrated preparation of budget
and monitoring of expenditure; and joint operational commands and staff
structures.
Achievement of jointness in services has been a
challenge for every nation. Although all military commanders are professedly staunch proponents of the concept of
jointness, the reality on ground is diametrically opposite. Every step towards
jointmanship is fought fiercely by the obstructionists. This dichotomy has been
the bane of the Indian armed forces as well. As a matter of fact, the problem gets compounded in
the case of India, as discussed subsequently.
Jointness is an Attitudinal
Trait
True jointness in military operations entails
reforms at three levels – structural, procedural and attitudinal. Although
structures and procedures are extremely important, they do not generate real
jointness unless accompanied by an attitude of collaborative
solidarity. Attitudes are usually defined as a disposition or
tendency to respond positively or negatively towards a certain thing (idea,
object, person or situation).
Attitude is an attribute of human
behaviour and defies cogent reasoning. Attitudes are affected both
by implicit and explicit influences. Attitudes can be positive, negative,
neutral and even ambivalent (possessing both positive and negative hues at the
same time). Even the degree or severity can vary. Attitudes are formed by
observational learning from the environment, individual judgments, personal
beliefs and peer influences. They encompass, or are closely related to, our
opinions and beliefs. As military is a hierarchy based organisation, attitudes
are influenced by precedents as well.
Response to jointness is an attribute of
underlying attitudes. Although every military commander swears by jointness,
their response varies from unstinted support to vehement opposition. Advocates
and supporters of jointness are willing to subordinate service and personal
interests to national interest. Neutralists or the fence-sitters accept
criticality of jointness but need assurance as regards safeguarding of their
own interests. Interestingly, even the obstructionists do not deny need for
jointness. However, due to their overwhelming concern for their selfish
interests; they invent most untenable and even ludicrous reasons for their
opposition.
Resistance to Jointness in the
Indian Armed Forces
Although, Joint Planning Committee was formed
after Independence, it took close to four decades for a proper Defence
Planning Staff to come into being in 1986. On the recommendations of the Group
of Ministers on reforming the National Security System, Headquarters Integrated
Defence Staff was set up in 2001 and the first unified command established at
Andaman and Nicobar Islands. India's first joint doctrine was issued only in
May 2006.
India’s track record in respect of jointness is
terribly poor. Ex-Naval Chief Admiral J G Nadkarni described the true state of
jointness in India when he said – “Jointmanship in India exists to the extent
of the three chiefs routinely being photographed backslapping each other, but
not much more beyond that. We mistake backslapping in public, playing golf
together and stating that they all belong to one course in the NDA as
jointmanship”. Similarly, affiliation of a few naval warships with army
regiments can at best be termed as a display of ceremonial interfacing. It is not
jointness at all.
Even Comptroller and Auditor General of India
has faulted the three services for a total lack of jointness in their
functioning, buying the same equipment from the same source at different
prices, thereby resulting in failure to obtain best value for money for the
country through economies of scale. It found that items (like Unmanned Arial
Vehicles, Sniper Rifles and Underwater Diving Equipment), which were common to
the three services, were procured by them independently without reference to
each other.
There are three major reasons for the tardy
introduction of jointness in the Indian services. Foremost of all,
jointness or unity is alien to our way of life. We lack a
culture of synergistic relationships and mutually accommodative demeanor. Our
approach, attitude and practices have always been directed towards remaining
disunited. We have a knack and penchant for generating innovative issues to
keep ourselves embroiled in petty bickering and internal dissentions.
The Indian armed forces are no exception.
Two, whereas joint warfare is team
warfare, the Indian services are afflicted by the concept of
regimental/corps/branch affiliations. Fierce factional loyalties result in
parochial mindset and inhibit development of broadmindedness. Infantry officers
resent induction of non-infantry officers in the general cadre. The
disagreeable equation between the flying branch and the other branches; fighter
pilots and transport pilots; and fighter pilots and helicopter pilots of the
air force has been a cause for concern. A helicopter veteran’s elevation to
head the air force became an issue of factional posturing. Military leaders who
fail to rise above petty prejudices within their own service can never be
expected to support inter-services jointness.
Three, despite all public bonhomie, there is a
deep rooted mistrust existing between the services. They guard their turf with
fanatic zeal. The level of distrust can be gauged from the fact that the army
prepared performance parameters for helicopters without consulting the air
force lest they torpedo the whole procurement proposal. Similarly, it never
consulted the navy while seeking deep sea diving equipment. Every proposal that
curtails a service’s sphere of control faces strident resistance. Besides, due
to the large strength of the Army, the smaller services are wary of jointness,
fearing loss of their independent identities.
Finally and most regretfully, egotism of some
top commander is proving to be the biggest hindrance. They support a proposal
only if it suits them personally. Else, they cook up innovative justifications
for obstructing it. It is a pure and simple case of according primacy to
personal interests. They swear by nationalism as long as it does not clash with
their own interests. Their apathetic deportment towards jointness shows their
total lack of concern for national security. Dreading loss of exclusivity and
privileged standing in the hierarchy-conscious organisation, they stoop to
unimaginable depths of self-seeking behaviour. All brouhaha by the
obstructionists about safeguarding national and service interests is sheer
baloney.
Government must Step-in
Kelkar Committee Report has also drawn
Government’s attention to the pressing need for jointness – “Unless, our
‘Joint’ capabilities are substantially and in a focused manner enhanced with a
clear vision for harnessing the existing and the emerging core technologies,
the gap between the ‘capability’ and our ‘ability to undertake assigned
missions’ would continue to grow.”
If the services continue their quibbling and
jointness remains stalled, the Government must intervene. It cannot let the
drift to continue. As consensus is the most preferred option, all efforts
should be made to remove dissonance between the three services. All conflicts
of interest – real or perceived – must be resolved in a spirit of mutual
accommodation. The services should be directed to adopt collaborative conflict
resolution methodology and achieve total jointness in a time-bound manner.
Should the facilitative approach fail to yield
the desired consensus, the Government should adopt a more pro-active approach.
The services must be told in categorical terms that the Government would
intercede compellingly in case the services fail to respond positively. It is
for the Government to handle the skeptics in a more persuasive manner to put
their reservations at rest and convince them of criticality of jointness. If
handled with firmness, finesse and empathy, most military leaders will come on
board.
In case persuasion also fails, the Government
should fulfill its obligation to the nation by issuing clear-cut orders to
enforce jointness. No disagreement thereafter should be tolerated. Dissenting
and obstructionist commanders should be given option to quit honorably.
Conclusion
Jointness does not mean that all forces will be
equally represented in each operation. Joint force commanders may choose the
capabilities they need from the forces at their disposal. Jointness means
integration of all force capabilities into a unified whole.
Jointness means conducting integrated military
operations with common strategy, methodology and execution. All Indian military
leaders recognise that jointness is central to national security and swear by
it. They concede that no future war can ever be won without total jointness in
letter and spirit. Despite all rhetoric in favour of jointness, the reality on
ground is diametrically opposite. It is a highly intriguing and paradoxical
situation.
Creation of the appointment of the Chief of
Defence Staff was attempted in 2002-03. It was to be the start-point of genuine
jointness in the Indian services. As is India’ misfortune, a handful of
self-seeking commanders ganged up to sabotage the most radical reform ever
attempted. Their impediment will go
down as the darkest chapter in India’s quest for upgradation of its war
potential. It was an anti-national act of grave magnitude. Such elements need
to be named and shamed.
The obstructionists let the nation down and
showed themselves to be unworthy of the high appointments they held. They made
themselves the object of ridicule and derision when they brazenly claimed that
their opposition was in national interest. Most disheartening was the stand
taken by a few retired Chiefs who wrote to the Prime Minister against the
proposal. Instead of guiding the current incumbents, they got carried away with
narrow service parochialism and brought ignominy to their own standing.
Finally, although consensus is desirable, it is
clear that the selfish elements in the services will continue their resistance
to jointness. The government will have to force the issue. Delay or wavering
can cause irreparable damage to national security imperatives. Whereas genuine
concerns of all must be addressed, unjustified obduracy should not be
tolerated. National security is too serious a matter to be permitted to be held
hostage to petty inter-service squabbles of parochial commanders. *****
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