by V Mahalingam
K Subramanyam the doyen of India’s strategic affairs community and an
expert recommended it; a Group of Ministers approved it and the all-knowing
Indian bureaucracy dumped it. So goes the story of the Chief of Defence Staff
(CDS). If the news report titled “Govt develops cold feet over General No 1”
published in a newspaper is to be believed, the Ministry of Defence (MOD) has
not felt the need for any change in the present system or for affecting some of
the critical reforms in the Higher Defence Management suggested by the Kargil
Review Committee (KRC). The proposal was stalled under the pretext that there
is a need to arrive at a political consensus. Opposition to the proposal from
the Air Force only aided the bureaucracy in blocking the proposal to protect
its turf interests.
Committee on
Committee on Committee
Committees are appointed to carryout in depth analysis of an issue by a
team of experts. When committees so appointed come out with inconvenient
recommendations, the Indian bureaucracy procrastinates over it till the issue
dies a natural death. Thus, having sat on the KRC report for over a decade and
not being able to kill the idea, yet another committee, the Naresh Chandra
Committee on Security Reforms was constituted. This committee watered down the
CDS proposal to suggest a permanent Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee
(CoSC). Neither of these reports has been made public thereby thwarting any
worthwhile professional or public debate. No one knows what efforts were made
to bring about the so called political consensus. The objections raised by the
Air Force were neither made public nor were they questioned. Now the MOD seems
to have come to a conclusion that there is no need for a CDS, CoSC or the other
reforms. On what basis such a decision was arrived at, is mystifying. Thirteen
valuable years have thus been squandered.
Speaking at Pune subsequently, the defence minister stated that he has
referred the matter to an independent committee and based on their advice the
matter will be referred to the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS). One more
committee with another committee to follow! Does that imply that the KRC and
the Naresh Chandra Committee were not independent and were biased or
subjective?
Objections
from the Air Force
Though the specific objections of the Air Force to the proposal has not
been made public, media reports suggest that the then Air Chief, Air Chief
Marshal Naik had raised three issues in this context. Coming from a stake
holder it needs consideration. The first point being that he “does not want the
CDS in the present form”. He however did not elaborate the shortcomings in the
model suggested or make any alternate proposal. The second question was “what
role model of CDS do we want?" No one knows what role model he had in his
mind. If he did have one, the people of this country are unable to read his
mind. The third objection was, “we don't need a CDS for the next five to ten
years." So they are needed after five to ten years? What changes in
warfare or in our security scenario does he anticipate that such an institution
will be required only after that period? On the face of it, these misgivings do
not seem relevant but isn’t it the job of the MOD to examine these issues or
allow public discussion to arrive at some clarity?
Apprehensions that the creation of the CDS would establish army’s
domination over the other services have also been articulated. Such views stem
from one’s inability to visualize the role of the CDS in future conflicts and
the way battles are expected to be directed and fought.
CDS or Joint
Chiefs of Staff
Does the country need a CDS or a Joint Chiefs of Staff? The answer lies
in how future conflicts are expected to unfold and the way they are planned to
be countered and managed. Which service would decide on the objective,
priorities of targets, allocate resources, and decide on other pressure points
to be coerced? Who would have the macro view of the overall situation not only
in areas of land battle but also in other domains? Who would be able to exploit
success in one theater to achieve a favorable outcome overall, while the
setbacks in another theater is being contained? Is it enough to have senior
officer collect information from the various services and pass it on to the
political heads? CDS obviously is the professional requirement in any future
conflict scenario.
The
absurdities
The Government of India Allocation of Business Rules and the Government
of India Transaction of Business Rules framed in 1961 has no place for the
service chiefs. According to these rules, the defence secretary is responsible
for the "Defence of India and every part thereof." He represents the
Service Chiefs in forums requiring professional military advice. India is
perhaps the only major democracy where the Service Headquarters are outside the
governmental structure. Though the Government changed the nomenclature of the
service headquarters to Integrated Headquarters of the Ministry of Defence,
nothing has changed in its structure or functioning.
In the present set up, the Chiefs of Staff have assumed the role of
operational commanders of their respective forces rather than that of Chiefs of
Staff to the political heads. They discharge the roles of operational
commanders and planners in relation to future equipment and force structures.
With the Service Chiefs kept out of the decision making process and the Defence
Secretary assuming the role of advisor to the political head, the Prime
Minister and Defence Minister have been deprived of professional views on
matters military.
Why doesn’t the bureaucracy see logic? Illiteracy and knowledge vacuum
prevents the bureaucracy to see beyond parochial interests. Notwithstanding the
Government of India Allocation of business rules, the bureaucracy is aware;
failures will not be attributed to their inefficiency or flawed policies. In
any case they are not required to face the bullet when the balloon goes up. The
military and its commanders can always be made the scapegoats. These preys
cannot speak and even if they do, they will only be castigated. Remember what
happened to General VK Singh when he spoke about operational state of the
Army?
Why CDS?
Modern conflict has changed in many ways. These changes have been marked
by multiple varieties of targets, objectives and evolution of new war fighting
techniques and capabilities. Technology has provided unimaginable capabilities
but it has placed upon a military commander the onus of placing such changes in
proper strategic context and managing war in all its dimensions. These
transformations will have to be objectively directed rather than events imposing
itself on the country. Under such circumstances the need for synergy amongst
different services is fundamental.
Defending a country’s sovereignty and integrity even under nuclear
backdrop and in a limited war scenario requires the employment multiple forces
including the Strategic Forces to pressure or strangulate the opponent in a
joint way. An asymmetrical war may be forced on the country in conjunction with
an incursion. The weight of the military may have to be applied at points
widely separated or even on targets different in nature by calculated
collaborative efforts to divert his strengths and to make him realize the cost
of a war. Such situations will go beyond the capabilities of a single service.
In such a scenario, there is a need for a professional institution with its
head to assess intelligence inputs, prioritize military actions, conceive a
joint operations plan, allocate war efforts and get the plan executed in
accordance with a time plan.
In peace time there is a need to evaluate threat perceptions, visualize
operational roles of various services, equip them based on priorities and put
them through joint training to enable them to learn to work as a joint body.
It is now
the peoples’ call
Committees have become a joke. Secrecy in defence related issues and the
freedom of speech snatched from a soldier are the alibis for skirting
professional concerns and keeping them under the wrap at the cost of the
national interests. Avoiding public debate when so much has been written and
spoken about in the media under the pretext of secrecy fools no one. It exposes
the government’s assumption that strategic issues and defence matters are
beyond the capabilities of the people to comprehend.
The Daulat Beg Oldie incident exposed the competences of the Ministry of
Defence who panicked and handed over the situation to the China Study Group
(CSG) when 30 Chinese soldiers come into our territory, pitched up tents and
decided to stay on. What will happen if Chinese decide to go on the offensive
is for the people to imagine.
Even if we adopt meaningful reforms today, it will take at least five
years for the idea to sink in, in the minds of junior leaders, commanders and
the troops. It is now for the people to decide if they want to maintain status
quo or move ahead. The choice is entirely theirs. Don’t blame the defence
services later.
No comments:
Post a Comment