by Lt Gen Anil Chait
At the outset, Lt Gen Bipin Rawat must be congratulated upon being appointed
as the next Chief of the Army Staff. His rich experience, exposure and hoary
regimental traditions will stand him in good stead as he assumes the mantle.
Lt Gen. Rawat’s challenges
are many. The most daunting will be to unite the institution, underlining a
single ethos against the diverse aspirations of soldiers. He has the potential
and time to do this.
Supersession of two very
competent seniors for the appointment
The government’s prerogative
to appoint the person who it considers most suitable in these circumstances, as
has been done, is unfettered. But it should have been accompanied by
transparency and logic.
Ability and seniority
In a hierarchical structure
such as in the Army, command authority is based on the twin planks of superior
professional ability and seniority. So far, the principle of selection has been
seniority-cum-merit unless there are compelling reasons to select otherwise.
The selection is made from amongst serving Army Commanders and the Vice Chief
of the Army Staff. The process involves filtering through over 37-38 years of
national service. The basis for elevation are personal qualities, demonstrated
performance and potential for next rank. Only one or two reach that position
from a full-year batch. This is unlike any other system and therefore the merit
factor is a given.
Against this backdrop, there
are four larger issues, all rooted in the existing operational and functional
ethos that the selection raises. They need to be addressed.
First, do the personal
capabilities and experience of the person being selected completely overwhelm
those of Lt. Gen. Praveen Bakshi and Lt Gen PM Hariz? After all, Lt Gen Bakshi
is commander-in-chief of the Eastern Command, operationally pitted against a
silent but ubiquitous Chinese threat alongside an insurgency that refuses to be
quelled. He dealt with Samba and Jammu infiltration situations as a Corps
Commander. For his part, Lt Gen Hariz has a reputation for his penchant for
concepts.
Basis for evaluation
What, therefore, is the basis
for a comparative evaluation and from where should it start? If it was so
relevant, why was this not done earlier? Incidentally, the officers are never
consulted in their growing-up years on what qualities they need to possess to
become suitable to lead the institution. Therefore, how will the present set of
formation commanders in peace formation, stationed for deterring war, react
after hearing that all things being equal, their future aspirations can only be
addressed by acquiring the experience of handling counter-insurgency
operations? Or how will the officers serving in the Eastern Command react to
being told that their own commander-in-chief’s experience is simply not good
enough?
An officer’s career graph and
experience are never of his own choosing. They follow a trajectory determined
by the Military Secretary’s branch, and the officer can only accumulate
experiential moss to the extent that he is allowed by the opportunities given
to him. He has no choice. If the argument of not having the right experience is
raised against a senior officer, to what extent is the affected officer liable
for the same? Should he pay a price for being deprived of a posting that
matches up to future requirements?
The second and more serious
question that arises relates to the future battle space as visualised by the
government and understood from the justifications of supersession. Would
threats the nation faces remain static in the near term and at the ground
level? If they change, then what? What if they change during the designate’s
tenure?
Of late we have been talking
of jointness, joint forces and joint responsibilities to attack the centre of
gravity to produce desired effects. Can this ever work if the government of the
day decides on a specialisation in the secondary field as the parameter for
selection at the highest level? Can such a proposition ever attract talent in
joint forces, which is still away from the main line of work?
Expectations of the government
The third question relates to
the expectations of the government from its Army Chief. Is his role to provide
overarching guidance and oversight to tactical-level operations or does he have
a larger charter to prepare for battles that will hopefully never be fought? Is
not all-around experience to be recognised as an attribute for selection?
And finally, to return to the
principle of seniority-cum-merit that has so far stood the test of time, for a
solution. The reason why the defence forces have remained apolitical so far is
that this principle annulled any need to develop political patronage in spite
of political control. If this continues, the days are not far when rising stars
of the armed forces will seek to curry political favours both through internal
and external mechanisms for ticket punching to ensure that they get their due.
Either way, the apolitical
fabric stands tattered and torn.
The net impact of this
unusual selection and supersession is that a narrow tactical advantage has been
seized by short-changing the needs of a comprehensive all-round perspective and
understanding of future wars. This needs to change and change immediately.
Anil
Chait is former Chief of Integrated Defence
Staff.
by kind courtesy of http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/Impact-of-an-unusual-selection/article16926545.ece?homepage=true
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