Kishan S Rana
|
Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai made
efforts at rapprochement but the scars of the 1962 war ran too deep for the
Indian PM
|
India-China relations in the past 50
years have been marked by a paradox. While India still carries scars of the
1962 border war, China hugely underestimated for many years the impact of the
war on India. This second of three articles* looks at the Beijing diplomatic
discourse in the immediate aftermath of 1962.
P K Banerjee (PKB) headed the Indian
Embassy in Beijing from June 1961 to December 1963; his book My Peking Memoirs of The Chinese Invasion of India, (Clarion, Delhi, 1990) has
received far less attention than it deserves; it details Chinese efforts to
engage India in political dialogue.
PKB had seven substantive meetings with
Premier Zhou, between the outbreak of the border war and 1963, besides his
farewell call. (Interestingly, the Chinesecharge d’affaires in New Delhi was not a
communication channel.) On October 24, Premier Zhou received PKB; the
atmosphere was “definitely chilly”. PKB writes, “He then said that the conflict
had to stop, it had to end! He had therefore written a letter to Mr Nehru with
three proposals: 1) the two countries should immediately agree to respect ‘the
line of actual control’, and their armed forces should disengage and withdraw
20 km from this line; 2) the Chinese troops in the eastern sector would
withdraw north of the line of actual control; 3) the prime ministers of the two
countries should meet to seek a friendly and peaceful settlement.”
In reply PKB presented the Indian
viewpoint, adding: “…China had agreed in 1960, when Zhou had visited New Delhi,
to maintain the status quo in the NEFA [North East Frontier Agency] area. At
this point he interrupted me sharply by saying that it was not true; he had
never given such an assurance.” On November 19 and 20, PKB had two more
meetings with Zhou.
In December 1962, PKB was instructed to
come to Delhi for the Sri Lankan prime minister’s visit; the six non-aligned
mediator “Colombo Powers” – Burma, Cambodia, Egypt, Ghana, Indonesia and Sri
Lanka – had advanced proposals to ease India-China tensions. This was PKB’s
first visit to Delhi during the assignment. Little wonder PKB felt he did not
understand New Delhi’s thinking.
On January 7, 1963, PKB was summoned,
told that he should come alone. PKB writes: “He [Zhou] was in a pensive mood
and somewhat tired, and said… he would like me to carry his very personal and
verbal message only for Mr Nehru’s ears. He continued that war never solved any
problems but only created new ones… positive steps were urgently required
besides public declarations and political statements. Mr Nehru, a man of high
philosophy and great vision, and he had known each other personally over a
period of many years [sic]. He understood Mr Nehru’s current political
predicaments but Mr Nehru should try and understand his (Chou En-lai’s)
position as well. Mr Nehru should help Mr Chou En-lai’s hand, and a hand
extended in friendship and cooperation…1) for the next three months, Mr Nehru
and he would stop making negative statements about each other’s country
although this may not stop others from making statements of counter-productive
nature. 2) Mr Nehru and he should meet as soon as possible with only a small
entourage, away from the press and publicity, in an agreed place, in order to
exchange ideas for an agreed and joint action to defuse the current situation.
This meeting in total privacy should last no longer than two days. 3) After
this meeting, which would further ensure in every way the strengthening of the
cease-fire line, the two governments would draw up a program where they could
jointly cooperate in areas like trade, science, culture and technology… When
the climate for mutual trust had been created, then the border disputes would
be discussed, on a sector to sector basis, by the two countries… He requested
me again to give this strictly private and personal message directly to Mr
Nehru.”
PKB decided to tell no one in Delhi
about the content of Zhou’s message, not even Foreign Secretary M J Desai. He
met Nehru several times: “[Nehru] wanted me to go with him to his office in
South block. In the car he… was mumbling to himself, “What went wrong, where
did I go wrong?” During my stay in New Delhi, I was with Mr Nehru a number of
times, and used to hear this type of monologue… [Some days later, at the prime
minister’s residence] He asked me about the message sent by Chou En-lai…
immediately after the meeting with Chou, I had myself typed out so that no
point might be missed… I gave him the one-page typed message which I carried
constantly with me inside my wallet. He started reading it… going over it a few
times. He then put down the paper on the table near him and seemed lost in
thought… He returned from his thoughts, looked at me and said that it was not
possible since matters had gone too far. He added that during my stay I had met
members after government and the opposition, press people, as well as ordinary
citizens, and surely I must’ve reached the same conclusion that no one in India
would stand anymore Chinese bluff and all nonsense. He briefly recalled his
efforts to help China with goodwill and friendship, and his close association
with Chou En-lai, whose betrayal had led to fraudulent territorial claims by
China and the invasion off India. He gave descriptions of meetings and details
of discussions and negotiations with Chou En-lai. It was a melancholy
monologue… [At a meeting some days later] He asked me if I had mentioned or
shown the substance of Chou En-lai’s message to anyone. I said that I had not.
He struck a match, and held the paper to the flames and burnt it over a large
crystal ash-tray. He said that from the Indian side it would take more than a
quarter of a century to return to any substantive negotiation, provided the
Chinese refrained from another attack on India.”
PKB returned to Beijing on January 28,
1963, and was summoned to meet Premier Zhou a few days later. “He asked whether
I had given his verbal message to Mr Nehru personally and wanted to know the
response. I told him briefly about the current atmosphere in India, and gave
him an outline of Mr Nehru’s reply, namely, that as a first step, China should,
like India, except the Colombo proposals in toto. India had announced her
acceptance on January 27.
After China’s acceptance in toto and
after the required implementation was completed by both countries, the second
step would be to discuss other matters. Chou En-lai was visibly excited, if not
angry, and said he had done everything within his power and that India would be
responsible for future stalemates and complications. He said that he would now
write formally to Mr Nehru on the matter.”
PKB had three more meetings with Zhou
in 1963, but efforts at dialogue were over. On December 17, 1963, Zhou,
unusually, received PKB for a farewell call; I was one of four officials that
accompanied him. In a cordial mood, Zhou said he was sorry to see PKB leave and
invited him to come again as his guest. About a year later, China was immersed
in the Cultural Revolution. The Chinese premier never received any other Indian
resident envoy. India next surfaced in Beijing’s agenda with Mao’s 1970 May Day
gesture — an event that also produced its misreading, but that is for another
day.
The first article
“Battle lines of the 1962 war” appeared on September 17. The
writer is a former ambassador, author, teacher and honorary fellow at Institute
of Chinese Studies, Delhi
The views expressed and Information provided
by the author are his own and left to public to judge and rationalise for
themselves.
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