By Lt Gen (Retd) S K Sinha
An authentic account of Sino-Indian War of 1962 and the events following it.
PART 1
- THE BACKGROUND
October 20 is the fiftieth anniversary of our
Himalayan Pearl Harbour. The humiliation
of a highly professional army of two centuries standing, with an outstanding war
record in battles fought over different continents, stunned the world. During the two world wars, the Indian Army
earned a very enviable reputation among the Allied armies. Winston Churchill referred to the over two
million Indian Army in laudatory terms, describing it as the largest volunteer
army known to history. Having seen the
prelude to the 1962 war from close quarters at the highest level, I shall recount
how the Army had started hurtling down towards an abyss from 1959 or even
earlier. Lt Gen B M Kaul and Air Vice Marshal Harjinder
Singh were both favourites of Defence Minister Krishna Menon and had direct
access to him. Besides, General Kaul was
very close to Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru.
The first three days of that war followed by a lull of nearly three
weeks and then the total disaster in the last three days. The strong defences at Se La were abandoned
by 4 Infantry Division. It withdrew
without putting up a fight. It was the same Division which in the Second World
War was regarded as the ace division of Allied armies during the North African
campaign. It had played a key role in
the historic battle of El Alamein. The
Chinese pursued the demoralised and routed Division down to the foothills near
Tezpur. The war ended with China declaring unilateral cease fire and their
withdrawing to the MacMohan Line. The Nation’s faith in the impregnability of
the Himalayas, the infallibility of our foreign policy and the invincibility of
our Army lay shattered.
A few weeks before he died, ailing Sardar Patel wrote a very perceptive
letter to Jawaharlal Nehru on 17 December 1950, warning him about Chinese
intentions and the need to make suitable defence preparations in the Himalayas. Nehru was then in the grip of Hindi Chini Bhai
Bhai euphoria. He did not attach much
importance to this letter. However, the
Minister of State for Defence, Himmat
Singh was asked to chair a committee to examine the issue. His report is not now traceable. It is said that Sardar Patel asked Jai Ram
Das Daulat Ram the Governor of Assam and responsible for NEFA , to send a
column to establish India’s sway over Towang, which lay South of the MacMohan
Line. The Lhasa Government had been
collecting revenue from Towang from before China’s occupation of Tibet. Major Bob Cutting a brave Naga erstwhile army officer
was then serving in IFAS, later absorbed in IAS. He then posted at Bomdila was given the task
of establishing control over Towang. He
departed with a company of Assam Rifles and a large number of porters for Towang,
along a difficult mountain foot track. It took him nearly two weeks to reach
his destination. With a show of force and
tact, he got the Tibetan officials to accept Indian control over Towang. Had he not done so, today Towang would have today
been in occupation of China. Nehru had
no prior information of this move and was upset when he heard of it. He felt that it would ruffle diplomatic
feathers. Anyway, the deed had been done
and he had to reconcile to it. After
the 1962 war, Henderson-Brooks - Bhagat report examined the course of
operations and the reasons for our debacle.
Fifty years have now elapsed and this report is still under wraps. It is generally believed that Neville Maxwell
had access to the report. His book, India’s
China War is based on it.
A look at the top personalities involved in the
run up to the 1962 disaster is revealing.
Jawaharlal Nehru was a great colossus.
The people had full faith in his judgment and no one dare express
contrary views. Nehru trusted Krishna
Menon implicitly and had a blind spot for him. Both Nehru and Menon firmly
believed that China will never go to war with India. Menon was said to have been a red card
holder. He was a highly intelligent person but very abrasive with his juniors
and those who opposed him. As Defence
Minister, he would deal directly with junior officers short circuiting the normal
chain of command. He had favourites and promoted
factionalism. He showed little regard
for Service Chiefs. Bhola Nath Mullik
was an outstanding Director Intelligence Bureau, whose forte was internal
intelligence. He had become the Man
Friday of Jawaharlal Nehru. At that time
there was no dedicated organisation for external intelligence. Adequate military intelligence about China or
Tibet was not available. The fact that the
Chinese woefully lacked suitable airfields in Tibet was known to US
intelligence but we in India were perhaps unaware of this. Mullick had an anti Army bias and fueled the
politician’s fear of the man on horseback.
The bureaucracy reinforced this for its vested interests, marginalising
the military in decision making. The
Service Chiefs did not interact directly with the Prime Minister.
Details about senior Army officers at the helm on
the eve of the 1962 war and during the course of it, are also relevant. General Thimayya was the Army Chief till a
year before that war broke out. He was a
very professional and charismatic
military leader. He was the only Indian
who had commanded a brigade in battle during the Second World War. He did so in the hardest fought Battle of
Kangaw in Burma against the Japanese, earning a high gallantry award. In the battle of Zoji La in Kashmir, he used
tanks to break through the 10,000 feet high pass. This was the first time in military history
that tanks were used at that height. I
am an eye witness to Thimayya as the Divisional Commander leading the assault
in a tank. As Chairman of the Neutral
Nations Repatriation Commission in Korea, he earned international fame. No General with better credentials had become
the Army Chief. Yet Thimayya was not
familiar with the ways of politics and politicians. He had strong differences with Krishna Menon which
got aggravated by the promotion of Maj Gen Kaul to Lt Gen and his posting as QMG in Army Headquarters
aginst Thimayya’s recommendations.. Kaul
as his Chief of Staff in Korea used to bypass him and exploit his connection
with Jawaharlal Nehru. Thimayya’s resignation
in 1959 caused a nationwide stir. Nehru persuaded him to withdraw his
resignation, pointing out that Field Marshal Ayub Khan was transiting through
Delhi and his resignation will send out a wrong message, tarnishing India’s
image. Later Nehru castigated him in the
Parliament. He failed to resign over this.
This seriously damaged Thimayya’s reputation and did immense harm to the
Army. Had he resigned again citing lack
of defence preparedness in the Himalayas, things could have been set right and
the 1962 war prevented. Instead, he
sulked and became a lame duck Chief for his remaining tenure. General Thapar took over from him and was
the Chief during the 1962 war. Lt Gen
Thorat was Eastern Army Commander. He
had won a gallantry award as a battalion commander in the battle of Kangaw and
again in Korea as Commander of the Custodian Force. He wanted to hold a defensive line based on Towang
–Bomdila- Along.
These places being at
road heads, we would be better placed administratively than the Chinese advancing
a hundred miles from the border, dependent on foot or mule tracks in
mountainous terrain. Thorat had planned
small listening posts covering the approach tracks near the border. These posts were trip wire posts to give
early warning and not to put up any fight.
Well behind this line would be a line of covering troops in good tactical
positions to gain time and impose attrition.
They were then to withdraw to the well stocked main defences which were
to be held at all costs to the last man and defeat the enemy offensive. Thorat retired
a year before the 1962 war. The third General holding a key appointment at that
time was Lt Gen L P Sen who had also won a gallantry award commanding a
battalion in the battle of Kangaw. On 7
November 1947 as Brigade Commander, he routed the invading Pakistan forces in
the decisive battle of Shelatang on the outskirts of Srinagar. That saved Srinagar and liberated the
Valley. Over the years his family
problems had broken him and he was now a different man. He was Eastern Army Commander during the 1962
war. Lt Gen Kaul with no combat experience and from
a non combat wing service of the Army
was appointed the field commander in NEFA to fight the Chinese. During the run up to that war and its conduct,
our competent and combat experienced senior military commanders, were rendered
ineffective. The individual gallantry of our soldiers in the prevailing circumstances
was of no avail. However, under
competent military leadership in the West, the Army gave a good account of
itself in Ladakh..
PART 2
- THE PRELUDE, THE WAR
AND AFTER
In 1960, to my great surprise I was posted to
Quarter Master General’s Branch at Army Headquarters. I was not happy about this posting but I had
no option. The all powerful QMG, Lt Gen Kaul
desired that I report to him immediately.
When I reported to him, he told me that he had specially selected me to
work as his personal staff officer as also with the newly started operational
logistic cell of three officers including me.
This cell is now a large Directorate of Logistics under a General
officer. I will record two instances
which I witnessed to show how powerful Kaul had become.
One day when I was in Kaul’s room he received a telephone
call about an Air Force Dakota on a supply mission in Nagaland being shot down
and pilots taken prisoners by Naga insurgents.
He rang up Nehru direct and apprised him of this. He told him that he was going to Nagaland
immediately. He asked an Air Force plane
to be positioned at Palam at once to take him to Nagaland. He asked me to inform the Chief’s Secretariat
that the QMG was going to Nagaland to conduct operations! QMG deals with administration and does not conduct
operations. This is the responsibility
of the General Staff. Yet everyone acquiesced
to Kaul having his way.
The other instance was when Kaul took me with him
to a meeting in Defence Minister’s room to discuss air maintenance ln Ladakh .
I was dealing with that subject and I had all the statistics with me. The
Defence Secertary, Pulla Reddy, a senior ICS officer was at the meeting. So was Air Marshal Engineer, the Air Chief
along with some senior Air Force officers.
At the instance of Menon, we had recently started getting military
hardware from Soviet Russia. Earlier, we
were obtaining all our military
equipment from the West. We had recently
acquired AN 12 transport aircraft from the Soviets for use in Ladakh. Menon
was under the impression that the Indian military brass was not too happy with
this. This was the first time I saw Menon
from close quarters. He drank several hot
cups of black tea at quick intervals. It
was said that during the day he would drink over sixty cups of tea. He appeared to have a bad liver that
morning. He told Pulla Ready that he had
neither any pull nor was he ever ready.
The Air Chief stated that flying to Ladakh was very hazardous and he
wanted to ground the AN 12s to carry out some checks. Menon replied sarcastically that all sorts of
checks and trials had been carried out before acquiring the AN 12s. It was now too late in the day to have
philosophic doubts about their performance.
He added that of course flying to Ladakh was hazardous but since when
has service in the Air Force begun to be equated with taking out a life
insurance policy. Engineer persisted
that he wanted checks to be carried for only two days. Krishna Menon now burst out saying, “ Air
Chief your mind is like a magnetic compass which reacts to every gravitational
change in the earth . As Defence Minister, I refuse to function like a gardener
who pulls out a plant every morning to see what progress it has made.” I was stunned at the Minister’s language. Half way through the meeting Kaul stood up
and said that he had to go to an important meeting and was leaving me to answer
any queries pertaining to the Army. I was surprised to see that Krishna Menon
nodded his head and Kaul departed. The
meeting appeared bizarre and to this day, I vividly recall the language used by Krishna
Menon.
Kaul was a workaholic and had tremendous drive. He achieved much in organising logistic
support for operational plans. However,
he was very ambitious and lacked strategic vision. He had political ambitions. After becoming Chief he apparently wanted to
be Prime Minister thereafter. A book,
After Nehru Who, published at that time mentioned him as a possible successor. More than half his time he devoted to work
not connected with his duties as QMG. Yet he did not neglect his duties and he
was one of our successful QMGs.
He laid the foundation for Directorate of
Logistics. For the first time Administrative Instructions for the three
operational Commands spelling out logistic plans were issued. In event of war with Pakistan, the Armoured
Division from Jhansi Babina was to concentrate in Punjab in three weeks at its
operational locations in Punjab. He felt
that this was much too long. He reduced
this period to three days. Under his
personal guidance, we worked tirelessly to achieve this target. Railways agreed to keep fifty per cent of the
rolling stock stationed permanently in Jhansi Babina, so that in emergency
train moves could start from the very first day instead of a couple of days
later. Units were trained to reduce
loading unloading time by half. All passenger and goods trains on the route had
to be suspended for three days to allow simultaneous troop specials on both Up and Down railway lines. Flyovers
at level crossings en route were constructed for uninterrupted road and rail
move. Distance to be covered by road
convoys each day was increased by 25 per cent.
It took nearly six months to complete this plan. A successful skeleton rehearsal was held to
validate it. In the East, Kaul wanted to
improve administrative infrastructure to support large scale operations. There was then no bridge over the
Brahmaputra. He planned an Army Maintenance Area to hold
stocks North of the river. A vast jungle area of a thousand acres was acquired
at Narangi, North of Guwahati. The process
of acquiring land, clearing jungles, constructing miles of internal roads, and
hard standings with overhead covers began.
The jungles were cleared. Several
thousand of tons of ammunition, equipment and stores were earmarked for this
Maintenance Area. Work on improving the
road from the foothills to Towang via Bomdila began. There was no road in the hundred mile stretch
from Towang to the border. Work on all this started in 1960 but during monsoon
work had to be suspended. Although much progress was made to complete all this
gigantic task, when the shooting war started in 1962, it was nowhere complete.
Thimayya was
approaching retirement in late 1961. He recommended Thorat to succeed him and Lt
Gen Verma appointed CGS. Kaul ensured
that his recommendation was turned down.
Thapar became the Army Chief and Kaul took over as CGS. He nominated me for a very coveted course in the
UK. I went abroad for a year and I
returned in September 1962.
Kaul had a flair for administration and had
extraordinary drive. He used his
political clout to achieve results. He lacked strategic and tactical
ability. He proved to be a poor
commander in battle. He promoted factionalism for his political motives. He projected himself as a nationalist and
took to wearing buttoned up coats when almost all officers wore lounge suits. He tried to build his coterie in the officer
corps often championing the cause of some superseded officers. He was good at doling favours to ambitious
officers. He had a court of inquiry
convened against Manekshaw for anti national activities. The inquiry exonerated Manekshaw. He discarded
Thorat’s sound operation plan and sponsored forward policy instead with a
bravado that not an inch of Indian territory, will be conceded even temporarily. Thus he deployed a totally ill prepared and
ill provided brigade on the indefensible Namka Chu river line against the enemy
on the dominating Thagla ridge. This
brigade got wiped out within hours of the commencement of the war.
In his enthusiasm, he exposed himself to the
severe climate in the high mountains and took ill for a while. He continued to
command the Corps from his sick bed in Delhi. After recovering quickly he
rushed back to his Headquarters at Tezpur well before the period of lull was
over. The Chinese infiltrated behind Se
La in the rear, cutting off the Division.
The Divisional Commander panicked and sought permission to withdraw. The
Army Chief and Eastern Army Commander were present at Tezpur but did not
intervene, waiting for Kaul to return from Walong Sector. When Kaul returned in the evening, he was
persuaded by the Divisional Commander to allow him to withdraw. In somewhat similar circumstances, when the British
Eighth Army was routed by Rommel’s Panzers
during the North Africa campaign in 1942 and he withdrew to El Alamein. General
Auchinleck who was the theatre commander, immediately rushed from Cairo to El
Alamein. He sacked Eighth Army Commander Lt Gen Ritchie and took over personal
command of the Army at El Alamein. He stabilised the situation and saved Egypt.
Unfortunately our top army leadership on that fateful day at Tezpur suffered a
paralysis of taking sound military
decision. The Divisional Commander conducted a totally disorganized withdrawal
on the night of 17/18 November night. The Division withdrew without putting up any
fight. The withdrawal became a complete rout.
The following day the famous 4 Infantry Division was virtually
decimated. By the 19th the Chinese
reached the foothills and then declared unilateral cease fire. Our top military
leadership had totally failed, letting down the Army and the Nation.
Had the Army Chief taken up matters directly with
the Prime Minister to ensure that the Thorat plan was not shelved and protested
against the forward policy, had he sacked
the Divisional Commander and even removed the Corps Commander and had he ordered
the troops at Se La to fight it out to the last and hold the formidable Se La
defences at all costs, the rout would have not taken place. After the humiliating war when Thorat met
Nehru and told him about his plan, he enquired why he had not been apprised
about the plan before the war. Menon
advocating Forward Policy had deliberately failed to do so. Further, had the then Air Chief gone to the
Prime Minister and insisted on the use of offensive air power, the war would have taken
a very different course. Unlike the
Chinese, we had developed airfields close to the area of operations. Though less in numbers, we had a qualitative
edge over Chinese combat aircraft. The
Chinese lacked the capability to bomb our cities. The Indian Air Force could have inflicted
crippling losses on the Chinese and boosted the morale of the soldiers on the
ground. The history of the Royal Air
Force in the famous Battle of Britain during the Second World War could have been
repeated by our Air Force.
After this diasatrous war Nehru was totally
shattered. He desperately appealed for offensive
support from the US Air Force. Churchill
faced a much greater disaster after Dunkirk in the Second World War. The entire British field Army had been
destroyed and Britain was bereft of any allies.
In our case the bulk of our field army was intact and we had friends to
help us. Relations between Soviet Russia and China were breaking. With the Himalayan passes closing due to snow
in winter and the Chinese invading army not having heavy guns or tanks, we
could make the Chinese bite the dust that winter. In 1940,
Winston Churchill after the Dunkirk debacle, thundered declaring, “We shall fight on the beaches, fight in the
streets but never surrender.”Jawharlal Nehru meekly accepted the unilateral
Chinese Cease Fire and a broken Prime Minister broadcast on the Radio that his
heart went out to the people of Assam.
I had returned from the UK in September 1962 and
was an Intructor at Staff College in Wellington. I closely watched from a great distance in
South India, the tragic drama unfolding in NEFA. After
the war, I was sent to the battlefield areas and study what had happened for
updating our mountain warfare training doctrine. I
went over the ground and also interacted with many friends at my level, who had
participated in that war. I found that we
had lost sight of our experience in Burma during the Second World War. Strong defensive positions must not be
abandoned even when enemy infiltrates behind and isolate them. Defensive positions can be air maintained. More
casualties are suffered in withdrawal which tends to become a rout than in fighting
from prepared defences. We updated at
the Staff College our training doctrine accordingly.
I also interacted with officers who had participated
in the recent operations. There were
three main reasons for our debacle. These were mismatch between foreign policy and defence policy, isolation
of the military in the process of decision making including lack of direct
interaction between the Prime Minister and Service Chiefs, and army officers losing their elan. There is now better interaction between defence
and foreign policy but this needs to be institutionalised. Cosmetic changes in higher defence organisation
without a CDS and full integration of the Defence Ministry with Service Headquarters,
will not do. During the wars of 1965 and
1971, Gen Chaudhuri was interacted
directly with Lal Bahadur Shastri and Gen Manekshaw with Indira Gandhi
respectively. This brought about successful results. The bureaucratic
stranglehold in Ministry of Defence must be eliminated bringing our Defence
functioning at the apex level, at par with other democracies in the world. Constantly lowering the protocol status of
military officers and denying them legitimate emoluments and career prospects,
are not conducive to maintaining their elan.
As for defence preparedness, unlike the Chinese, we have been
lackadaisical. Weapon acquisition, improving defence infrastructure and our
Defence capability are not keeping pace. The recent decision to cancel the
raising of a mountain corps during the Chinese Defence Minister’s visit is incredible.
In conclusion, I may mention that the darkest
clouds have silver linings. The 1962 catastrophe also was a wakeup call for us. Thus we could shatter Ayub Khan’s dream of
his tanks rolling down the plains of Panipat. And in 1971, we could achieve a
decisive and historic victory. Let us
not at all costs go back to the somnolence of the pre 1962 days. Eternal vigilance is the price of liberty.
An interesting and authentic account.
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